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ABSTRACT	  WALTER	  EDWARD	  BROWNLOW:	  Shaping	  The	  Spread	  Of	  Ideas:	  	  The	  Mechanics	  of	  Radicalization,	  Construction	  of	  Strategic	  Narratives,	  and	  Intrinsicness	  of	  Strategic	  Communications	  to	  Counter	  Radicalization	  Strategies	  (Under	  the	  direction	  of	  Dr.	  Holger	  Moroff)	  	   This	  essay	  examines	  preventative	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts	  as	  a	  response	  to	  violent	  extremism	  in	  Islamic	  cultures.	  It	  argues	  for	  the	  prudence	  of	  a	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  and	  explores	  the	  means	  through	  which	  it	  may	  be	  implemented	  most	  effectively.	  It	  emphasizes	  the	  accuracy	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  messaging	  when	  communicating	  with	  target	  audiences.	  The	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  essay	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  the	  concept	  of	  strategic	  communications	  and	  analyzes	  their	  role	  in	  successful	  efforts	  to	  counter	  radical	  narratives	  and	  provide	  credible	  alternate	  narratives.	  A	  primary	  focus	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  strategic	  communications	  framework	  to	  a)	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  policy	  cohesion	  –	  i.e.	  how	  communications	  affect	  the	  government	  networks	  that	  formulate	  and	  implement	  policies,	  and	  b)	  effective	  signaling	  and	  response	  to	  target	  audiences	  when	  constructing	  or	  countering	  narratives.	  During	  the	  course	  of	  its	  arguments,	  the	  essay	  examines	  the	  process	  of	  radicalization	  and	  analyzes	  recommended	  policy	  responses	  from	  Western	  governments,	  specifically	  the	  United	  States.	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Introduction	  
A	  rise	  in	  extremist	  political	  violence	  following	  the	  Cold	  War	  has	  produced	  a	  new	  set	  of	  challenges	  for	  strategists	  seeking	  to	  ensure	  security	  and	  stability	  for	  Western	  liberal	  democracies.	  	  In	  particular,	  the	  growing	  number	  and	  popularity	  of	  extremist	  groups	  within	  the	  larger	  subset	  of	  political	  Islam	  poses	  a	  significant	  threat	  to	  economic,	  social,	  and	  political	  stability	  in	  many	  parts	  the	  world,	  including	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Europe.	  Characterized	  by	  both	  violent	  radicalism	  and	  a	  common	  narrative	  that	  serves	  to	  unite	  often-­‐disparate	  individuals	  under	  the	  common	  cause	  of	  global	  jihad,	  these	  groups	  have	  created	  transnational	  networks	  seeking	  to	  force	  political	  change	  on	  local,	  regional,	  and	  international	  levels.	  Although	  hard	  security	  threats	  may	  require	  kinetic	  responses	  from	  governments	  to	  meet	  short-­‐term	  and	  often	  mid-­‐term	  security	  concerns	  (responses	  including	  combat	  operations,	  suppression,	  detection,	  prosecution,	  etc),	  addressing	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  violent	  radicalism	  is	  increasingly	  thought	  to	  require	  a	  balance	  of	  kinetic	  force	  and	  nuanced,	  cognitive	  approaches	  focused	  on	  sustainable,	  long-­‐term	  solutions.	  Towards	  that	  end,	  the	  work	  of	  many	  social	  scientists	  and	  security	  strategists	  is	  focused	  on	  counter	  measures	  aimed	  at	  preventing	  radicalization	  –	  nipping	  the	  threat	  in	  the	  bud,	  so	  to	  speak.	  Other	  researchers	  and	  strategists	  have	  argued	  against	  focusing	  counter	  terrorism	  efforts	  on	  counter	  radicalization.	  One	  reason	  for	  this	  argument	  is	  a	  belief	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that	  violent	  extremists	  transcend	  contemporary	  ideologies.	  In	  effect	  this	  argument	  states	  that	  extremists	  existed	  before	  radical	  Islam	  and	  will	  continue	  to	  exist	  afterwards;	  focusing	  on	  Islamic	  radicalization	  will	  not	  prevent	  political	  terrorists	  from	  proliferating	  or	  acting.	  Other	  analysts	  conclude	  the	  only	  forces	  that	  can	  effectively	  reverse	  the	  spread	  of	  radical	  Islamic	  ideologies	  are	  moderate	  forces	  within	  the	  faith.	  A	  third	  argument	  against	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  states	  that	  most	  radical	  groups	  are	  non-­‐violent,	  and	  resources	  will	  be	  more	  efficiently	  spent	  combatting	  specific	  groups	  known	  to	  engage	  in	  terrorist	  activities.	  	  	  This	  essay	  argues	  counter	  radicalization	  is	  a	  prudent	  strategy	  for	  the	  following	  reasons:	  there	  are	  differences	  between	  “old”	  and	  “new”	  terrorism,	  and	  convincing	  arguments	  can	  be	  made	  that	  modern	  jihad	  and	  the	  unique	  threats	  it	  poses	  require	  original	  and	  specific	  policy	  responses	  from	  contemporary	  governments.	  There	  also	  is	  concern	  because	  the	  ideologies	  of	  many	  non-­‐violent	  radical	  Islamic	  groups	  share	  several	  narrative	  precepts	  with	  violent	  extremist	  groups,	  and	  thus	  may	  serve	  to	  create	  violent	  actors	  from	  the	  larger	  population	  and	  feed	  terrorist	  groups,	  functioning	  as	  somewhat	  of	  a	  “conveyor	  belt.”	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  effective	  counter	  strategy	  must	  confront	  the	  meta-­‐narrative	  that	  drives	  the	  ideologies	  of	  both	  types	  of	  group.	  In	  addition,	  preventative	  policy	  recommendations	  focusing	  solely	  on	  groups	  known	  to	  be	  violent	  are	  generally	  consistent	  with	  larger	  counter	  radicalization	  policy	  recommendations,	  differing	  mainly	  in	  the	  size	  and	  specificity	  of	  the	  audience	  with	  which	  the	  policies	  seek	  to	  communicate.	  Pursuing	  a	  comprehensive	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  does	  not	  contradict	  the	  recommendations	  of	  more	  focused	  strategies	  and	  simultaneously	  addresses	  
	   3	  
concerns	  from	  both	  sides	  of	  the	  debate	  on	  threats	  posed	  by	  violent	  vs.	  non-­‐violent	  groups.	  Implementing	  a	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  addresses	  long-­‐term	  security	  concerns,	  and	  by	  requiring	  greater	  cohesiveness	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  policy	  also	  may	  serve	  grander	  U.S.	  foreign	  policy	  goals	  for	  greater	  economic	  integration	  and	  interdependence	  between	  the	  West	  and	  states	  in	  the	  developing	  world.	  	  This	  essay,	  divided	  into	  four	  sections,	  argues	  for	  the	  prudence	  of	  preventative	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  and	  explores	  the	  means	  through	  which	  it	  may	  be	  implemented	  most	  effectively.	  It	  places	  emphasis	  on	  the	  accuracy	  and	  appropriateness	  of	  messaging	  when	  communicating	  with	  target	  audiences.	  The	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  essay	  seeks	  to	  clarify	  the	  concept	  of	  strategic	  communications	  and	  analyzes	  their	  role	  in	  the	  development	  and	  implementation	  of	  successful	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts.	  A	  primary	  focus	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  strategic	  communications	  framework	  to	  a)	  developing	  and	  maintaining	  policy	  cohesion	  –	  i.e.	  how	  communications	  affect	  the	  government	  networks	  that	  formulate	  and	  implement	  policies,	  and	  b)	  effective	  signaling	  and	  response	  to	  target	  audiences	  when	  constructing	  or	  countering	  narratives.	  During	  the	  course	  of	  its	  arguments,	  the	  essay	  examines	  the	  process	  of	  radicalization	  and	  analyzes	  recommended	  policy	  responses	  from	  Western	  governments,	  specifically	  the	  United	  States.	  	  	  Structure	  of	  Essay	  Following	  a	  definition	  of	  terms,	  the	  first	  section	  of	  the	  essay	  provides	  historical	  and	  political	  context	  for	  Islamic	  radicalization.	  It	  begins	  by	  examining	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underlying	  causes	  of	  Jihad	  in	  relation	  to	  earlier	  radical	  movements	  and	  argues	  that	  while	  they	  are	  similar	  social	  and	  political	  phenomenon,	  the	  scope	  and	  methods	  of	  the	  global	  Jihadist	  movement	  create	  security	  concerns	  that	  require	  pro-­‐active	  and	  preventative	  counter	  measures.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  section	  examines	  the	  distinction	  between	  radicalism	  and	  violent	  extremism	  and	  the	  implications	  the	  difference	  has	  on	  counter	  strategies.	  It	  concludes	  by	  arguing	  that	  a	  wider	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  is	  preferable	  to	  a	  focus	  on	  violent	  extremists	  because	  the	  policy	  requirements	  of	  both	  are	  similar,	  but	  counter	  radicalization	  strategies	  also	  address	  “conveyor-­‐belt”	  groups	  that	  may	  be	  steering	  at-­‐risk	  individuals	  towards	  violent	  extremism.	  	  Compared	  to	  a	  more	  narrow	  focus	  on	  violent	  extremism,	  counter	  radicalization	  strategies	  also	  may	  provide	  greater	  utility	  to	  the	  long-­‐standing	  U.S.	  grand	  strategy	  of	  expanding	  liberal	  peace	  through	  economic	  integration	  and	  complex	  interdependence.	  	  The	  second	  section	  explores	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  of	  radicalization.	  In	  order	  to	  formulate	  and	  implement	  effective	  counter	  measures	  to	  radicalization	  and	  extremism,	  it	  is	  first	  necessary	  to	  understand	  the	  social	  mechanics	  that	  allow	  widespread	  radicalization	  to	  occur	  and	  in	  turn	  violent	  extremists	  to	  proliferate.	  This	  section	  draws	  on	  the	  work	  of	  behavioral	  scientists,	  political	  scientists,	  and	  anthropologists,	  and	  includes	  models	  for	  norm	  creation,	  group	  dynamics,	  and	  social	  order	  and	  hierarchy	  within	  radical	  and	  violent	  groups.	  This	  section	  emphasizes	  the	  three	  aspects	  of	  radicalization	  most	  analysts	  find	  necessary	  for	  producing	  terrorist	  actions:	  grievance,	  ideology,	  and	  mobilization.	  It	  concludes	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  narrative	  as	  a	  means	  through	  which	  political	  and	  religious	  leaders	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contextualize	  individual	  experience	  within	  a	  group	  identity,	  specifically	  how	  individual	  grievances	  are	  coalesced	  into	  a	  shared	  and	  constructed	  ideology.	  	  The	  third	  section	  examines	  counter	  radicalization	  policies	  as	  they	  apply	  to	  combatting	  the	  Jihadist	  meta-­‐narrative.	  It	  begins	  by	  addressing	  grievances	  and	  the	  question	  of	  theological	  legitimacy	  –	  specifically	  the	  lack	  of	  theological	  legitimacy	  possessed	  by	  secular	  Western	  governments	  and	  the	  need	  for	  moderate	  Islamic	  partners	  and	  stakeholders.	  The	  focus	  then	  narrows	  on	  two	  primary	  and	  complementary	  strategies	  available	  to	  Western	  governments	  seeking	  to	  combat	  Jihadist	  narratives:	  1)	  the	  creation	  and	  communication	  of	  credible	  alternate	  narratives,	  and	  2)	  countering	  Jihadist	  narratives	  by	  discrediting	  their	  logic	  and	  leaders.	  This	  section	  identifies	  a	  key	  difficulty	  to	  U.S.	  attempts	  to	  construct	  a	  credible	  alternate	  narrative	  as	  the	  communication	  of	  conflicting	  messages	  to	  the	  target	  audience.	  The	  section	  concludes	  by	  focusing	  on	  the	  deconstruction	  of	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative	  through	  existing	  and	  potential	  counter	  narrative	  operations.	  	  The	  fourth	  and	  final	  section	  of	  the	  essay	  provides	  analysis	  of	  strategic	  communications	  in	  both	  the	  construction	  of	  a	  credible	  alternate	  narrative	  and	  effective	  countering	  of	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative.	  The	  first	  half	  of	  the	  section	  examines	  how	  strategic	  communications	  may	  be	  best	  applied	  internally	  as	  a	  conceptual	  framework	  through	  which	  to	  generate,	  receive,	  and	  share	  feedback	  among	  government	  agencies	  and	  their	  partners.	  It	  begins	  with	  an	  explanation	  of	  how	  a	  well-­‐conceived	  communications	  framework	  can	  minimize	  the	  transmission	  of	  conflicting	  messages,	  thus	  increasing	  cohesion	  and	  credibility	  of	  the	  narrative	  the	  messages	  are	  attempting	  to	  construct.	  The	  latter	  half	  of	  the	  section	  focuses	  on	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strategic	  communications	  in	  counter	  narrative	  operations.	  This	  includes	  public	  diplomacy,	  direct	  engagement,	  and	  also	  less	  traditional,	  subtler,	  even	  clandestine	  methods	  of	  messaging	  Islamic	  populations.	  Methods	  examined	  include	  commercial	  marketing	  strategies	  and	  the	  manipulation	  of	  pop-­‐culture	  and	  public	  discourse	  via	  radio,	  TV,	  and	  Internet.	  The	  section	  concludes	  by	  analyzing	  the	  effectiveness	  and	  risks	  associated	  with	  counter	  narrative	  operations.	  The	  essay	  concludes	  by	  revisiting	  the	  utility	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  can	  provide	  both	  preventative	  counter	  terrorism	  efforts	  and	  foreign	  policies	  intended	  to	  deepen	  liberal	  integration	  and	  economic	  interdependence	  with	  the	  developing	  world.	  It	  reviews	  the	  strategic	  goals,	  situational	  analysis,	  and	  policy	  recommendations	  discussed	  earlier	  in	  the	  essay,	  and	  re-­‐emphasizes	  the	  need	  for	  a	  better	  conception	  and	  application	  of	  strategic	  communications	  if	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts	  are	  to	  achieve	  sustainable	  long-­‐term	  success	  in	  both	  their	  security	  and	  political	  dimensions.	  	  Definition	  of	  Terms	  
A) Islamism	  –	  The	  belief	  that	  the	  religion	  of	  Islam	  should	  guide	  political	  and	  social	  life	  in	  addition	  to	  spiritual	  life.	  	  Islamists	  are	  not	  radicals	  by	  definition,	  and	  simply	  believe	  politics	  should	  be	  guided	  by	  and	  adhere	  to	  Islamic	  law	  and	  principles.	  B) Radicalism	  –	  Political	  radicalism	  denotes	  “political	  principles	  focused	  on	  altering	  social	  structures	  through	  revolutionary	  means	  and	  changing	  value	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systems	  in	  fundamental	  ways.”1	  It	  is	  helpful	  to	  remember	  that	  “radical”	  is	  a	  relative	  term	  dependent	  on	  established	  social	  norms,	  and	  often	  radicalization	  occurs	  in	  both	  sides	  of	  a	  conflict.2	  In	  the	  context	  of	  this	  essay	  radicalism	  can	  be	  defined	  as	  a	  form	  of	  Islamism	  that	  employs	  revolutionary	  rhetoric	  (although	  not	  necessarily	  violence)	  as	  a	  means	  to	  alter	  social	  structures	  and	  change	  value	  systems	  in	  ways	  consistent	  with	  a	  fundamentalist	  Islamic	  theology.	  	  
C) Jihad	  –	  An	  Islamic	  religious	  duty	  that	  technically	  means	  to	  ‘struggle.’	  Many	  past	  and	  present	  scholars	  interpret	  this	  struggle	  as	  a	  battle	  within	  one’s	  self	  to	  live	  a	  better	  life	  according	  to	  the	  will	  of	  Allah.	  Within	  radical	  ideologies,	  Jihad	  as	  seen	  as	  a	  struggle	  against	  non-­‐believers,	  particularly	  the	  people,	  governments,	  and	  political	  forces	  represented	  by	  the	  ‘West.’	  Radical	  ideologies	  may	  preach	  spiritual,	  political,	  or	  militant	  Jihad,	  but	  all	  employ	  revolutionary	  rhetoric	  and	  advocate	  resistance	  to	  Western	  political	  and	  cultural	  influence.	  Militant	  Jihad	  includes	  violent	  actions	  taken	  against	  Western	  people	  and	  interests,	  including	  terrorism.	  
D) Violent	  Extremism	  –	  A	  Western	  term	  for	  words	  and	  actions	  that	  either	  support,	  enable,	  or	  engage	  in	  acts	  of	  violence	  to	  further	  the	  goals	  and	  ideology	  of	  the	  most	  radicalized	  segments	  of	  society.	  The	  British	  Crown	  Prosecution	  Service	  defines	  violent	  extremism	  as	  the	  “demonstration	  of	  unacceptable	  behavior	  by	  using	  any	  means	  or	  medium	  to	  express	  views	  which	  foment,	  justify	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Wikipedia	  (undated)	  Online.	  Retrieved	  04/05/13	  from	  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Political_radicalism	  	  	  2	  Schmidt,	  Alex.	  (2013).	  Radicalization,	  Counter	  Radicalization,	  and	  De-­‐Radicalization:	  A	  conceptual	  discussion	  and	  literature	  
review.	  ICCT	  Research	  Paper	  for	  the	  International	  Center	  for	  Counter	  Terrorism	  –	  The	  Hague	  [Online]	  Retrived	  04/02/13	  from	  http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-­‐Schmid-­‐Radicalisation-­‐De-­‐Radicalisation-­‐Counter-­‐Radicalisation-­‐March-­‐2013.pdf	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or	  glorify	  terrorist	  violence	  in	  furtherance	  of	  particular	  beliefs”	  3	  Laurrie	  Fenstermaker	  points	  out	  in	  a	  2011	  strategic	  assessment	  of	  counter	  terrorism	  strategy	  that	  this	  definition	  includes	  not	  only	  those	  who	  engage	  in	  or	  provide	  material	  support	  for	  terrorist	  actions,	  but	  also	  those	  who	  use	  words	  to	  incite	  terrorist	  violence.4	  
E) Terrorism	  –	  Frequently	  defined	  as	  a	  form	  of	  political	  expression	  in	  which	  radicalized	  extremists	  communicate	  a	  message	  through	  violent	  action.	  Modern	  terrorism	  often	  involves	  the	  indiscriminate	  killing	  of	  civilians	  in	  order	  to	  create	  a	  psychological	  response	  within	  a	  target	  audience	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  weakening	  political	  and	  military	  resistance	  to	  the	  political	  objectives	  pursued	  by	  those	  executing	  the	  act.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  there	  are	  multiple	  definitions	  and	  conceptions	  of	  terrorism,	  partly	  because	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  action,	  and	  partly	  because	  terrorism,	  like	  radicalism,	  is	  a	  relative	  term.	  As	  many	  scholars	  are	  fond	  of	  pointing	  out,	  “One	  man’s	  terrorist	  is	  another	  man’s	  freedom	  fighter.”	  	  
F) Narrative	  (specifically	  Jihadist	  narrative)	  –	  A	  story	  or	  account	  of	  events	  that	  connects	  and	  places	  them	  in	  context	  with	  one	  another,	  often	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  ascribe	  or	  explain	  causality.	  Narratives	  can	  take	  many	  forms	  –	  non-­‐fiction,	  fiction,	  and	  fictionalized	  history	  are	  all	  different	  types	  of	  narratives	  presented	  in	  books,	  but	  the	  distinction	  between	  fiction	  and	  non-­‐fiction	  becomes	  less	  clear	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Violent	  Extremism	  and	  Related	  Criminal	  Offences.	  (2006).	  Crown	  Prosecution	  Service,	  UK.	  Online.	  Retrieved	  on	  03/14/2013	  from:	  	  http://www.cps.gov.uk/publications/prosecution/violent_extremism.html	  (Cited	  by	  Fenstermaker,	  pg.	  5	  –	  see	  below)	  	  	  4Fenstermaker,	  Laurrie	  (2011).	  Executive	  Summary.	  In	  Fenstermaker, Laurrie, and Todd Leventhal	  Fenstermaker, L., and 
Leventhal, T., (Eds.), Countering	  Violent	  Exremism:	  Scientific	  Methods	  and	  Strategies.	  TOPICAL STRATEGIC MULTI-LAYER 
ASSESSMENTAND AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY MULTI-DISCIPLINARY WHITE PAPERIN SUPPORT OF 
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-WMD. (p. 6) Retrieved online on 03/26/13 from: 
http://www.nsiteam.com/pubs/U_Counter%20Violent%20Extremism%20Final_Approved%20for%20Public%20Release_28Oct11v3.
pdf	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when	  examining	  political	  communications.	  This	  is	  because	  narratives	  shape	  reality	  by	  providing	  the	  frame	  in	  which	  it	  is	  perceived,	  organized,	  and	  understood.	  There	  are	  many	  narratives	  that	  support	  violent	  political	  acts	  carried	  out	  in	  the	  name	  of	  Islam,	  but	  almost	  all	  share	  four	  characteristics.	  Together	  they	  provide	  an	  over-­‐arching	  Jihadist	  meta-­‐narrative:	  1)	  Islam	  is	  under	  unjust	  attack	  from	  the	  West,	  2)	  It	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  muslims	  to	  defend	  Islam	  against	  this	  attack,	  3)	  Terrorist	  actions	  constitute	  a	  just	  defense	  of	  Islam	  and	  are	  religiously	  sanctioned,	  and	  4)	  It	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  Muslims	  who	  do	  not	  engage	  in	  militant	  Jihad	  to	  support	  those	  who	  do.	  
G) Counter	  Terrorism	  –	  Efforts	  to	  combat	  terrorism	  employed	  by	  the	  governments	  it	  targets.	  Traditional	  methods	  of	  counter	  terrorism	  are	  typically	  kinetic	  operations	  undertaken	  by	  military,	  intelligence,	  and	  police	  agencies	  designed	  to	  detect,	  suppress,	  prosecute,	  and	  eliminate	  extant	  terrorist	  activity.	  	  
H) Counter	  Radicalization	  –	  A	  preventative	  approach	  to	  counter	  terrorism	  aimed	  at	  “nipping	  it	  in	  the	  bud”	  through	  identifying,	  addressing,	  and	  alleviating	  the	  factors	  that	  create,	  drive,	  and	  enable	  radicalization	  to	  occur.	  The	  financial	  and	  political	  costs	  of	  traditional	  counter	  terrorism	  efforts,	  combined	  with	  their	  seeming	  ineffectiveness	  in	  terms	  of	  preventing	  the	  spread	  of	  radical	  and	  violent	  extremist	  ideology	  (in	  many	  cases	  actually	  contributing	  significantly	  to	  its	  growth)	  have	  created	  a	  demand	  for	  research	  related	  to	  counter	  radicalization	  strategies.	  
I) Strategic	  Communications	  –	  Traditionally	  associated	  with	  military	  or	  police	  activity.	  Words	  and	  actions	  constituting	  messages	  communicated	  with	  the	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purpose	  of	  signaling	  and	  explaining	  intent	  to	  allies	  and	  adversaries.	  This	  essay	  echoes	  the	  evolving	  opinion	  that	  strategic	  communications	  require	  synchronization	  between	  messages	  sent	  by	  words	  and	  those	  sent	  through	  actions.	  They	  also	  may	  be	  better	  utilized	  and	  understood	  as	  including	  an	  internal	  element	  –	  “a	  more	  complex,	  cross-­‐governmental	  activity;	  as	  the	  means	  for	  presenting	  and	  explaining	  ‘comprehensive’	  or	  ‘integrated’	  policies.”5	  	  
	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Cornish,	  P.,	  Lindley-­‐Franch,	  J.,	  Yorke,	  C.	  (2011)	  Strategic	  Communications	  and	  National	  Strategy.	  (p.	  V	  –	  Preface	  and	  Acknowledgments)	  Retrieved	  online	  from	  03/12/13	  from	  http://www.chathamhouse.org/sites/default/files/public/Research/International%20Security/r0911stratcomms.pdf	  
	  	  
Section	  I	  –	  The	  Case	  for	  Counter	  Radicalization	  
Part	  I	  –	  The	  Political	  Context	  and	  “Old”	  vs.	  “New”	  Terrorism	  	  
	   The	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  and	  rapid	  globalization	  that	  followed	  produced	  a	  massive	  expansion	  of	  liberal	  values	  and	  interests	  into	  parts	  of	  the	  world	  in	  which	  the	  two	  did	  not	  always	  complement	  one	  another,	  much	  less	  interact	  symbiotically	  with	  the	  local	  status	  quo.	  In	  his	  2005	  book	  ‘Globalization	  and	  Terrorism,’	  Jamal	  Nassar	  provides	  an	  explanation	  for	  the	  causes	  of	  modern	  terrorist	  campaigns	  against	  the	  west	  by	  combining	  “balance	  of	  power”	  rationale	  with	  what	  he	  refers	  to	  as	  an	  expectations	  gap	  between	  the	  promise	  of	  liberal	  values	  propagated	  by	  the	  West	  and	  the	  reality	  experienced	  by	  those	  on	  the	  ground	  in	  traditionally	  Muslim	  countries.	  He	  defines	  terrorism	  as	  a	  fundamentally	  political	  act,	  and	  conceives	  it	  as	  the	  result	  of	  a	  struggle	  for	  power	  on	  both	  a	  geopolitical	  and	  personal	  level.6	  
	   In	  Nassar’s	  conception,	  the	  end	  of	  the	  Cold	  War	  produced	  a	  liberal	  hegemony	  that	  approached	  American	  empire.	  In	  this	  sense	  resistance	  to	  the	  expansion	  of	  Western,	  and	  particularly	  American,	  influence	  is	  a	  completely	  rational	  expectation	  in	  which	  terrorism	  is	  merely	  the	  most	  effective	  means	  of	  resistance	  available	  to	  asymmetrically	  matched	  adversaries.	  Nassar	  describes	  the	  leadership	  of	  the	  Al	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Nassar,	  Jamal.	  (2005)	  Globalization	  and	  Terrorism:	  The	  Migration	  of	  Dreams	  and	  Nightmares.	  Rowman	  and	  Littlefield:	  Oxford,	  UK.	  (pp.	  23-­‐35)	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Queda	  network	  in	  classically	  Realist	  terms	  in	  which	  the	  Islamists’	  goal	  is	  defined	  not	  by	  “altruistic	  intentions	  of	  fighting	  an	  ‘evil	  empire’	  and	  fulfilling	  the	  orders	  of	  Allah	  on	  Earth,”	  but	  rather	  an	  interest	  in	  achieving	  absolute	  power	  over	  a	  territorial	  area	  in	  which	  they	  can	  implement	  their	  political	  and	  social	  agendas.7	  Nassar	  also	  identifies	  terrorism	  as	  a	  desperation	  response	  by	  individuals	  to	  oppression	  and	  injustices	  that	  the	  West	  is	  perceived	  as	  creating,	  committing,	  or	  enabling.	  In	  this	  sense	  there	  are	  two	  types	  of	  terrorist	  actors:	  the	  political	  actors	  taking	  part	  in	  a	  geopolitical	  struggle	  against	  hegemony,	  and	  those	  engaged	  in	  terrorism	  as	  “a	  response	  of	  desperation”	  to	  the	  struggle	  for	  power.	  This	  second	  category	  of	  terrorists,	  “have	  certain	  basic	  wishes,	  needs,	  or	  instincts	  that,	  if	  frustrated,	  contribute	  to	  aggressive	  behavior	  that	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  violence	  and	  revolution.”8	  Nassar’s	  explanation	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  terrorists	  can	  have	  both	  overtly	  political	  and	  psychologically	  reactionary	  motives	  for	  their	  actions,	  in	  addition	  to	  whatever	  religious	  and	  ideological	  fervor	  they	  may	  experience.	  
In	  this	  sense	  modern	  Islamic	  terrorism	  is	  similar	  to	  terrorism	  employed	  by	  earlier	  political	  and	  ideological	  movements	  –	  19th	  century	  anarchists,	  20th	  century	  anti-­‐colonial	  nationalists,	  and	  Cold	  War-­‐era	  leftists	  were	  all	  movements	  characterized	  by	  radical	  opposition	  to	  the	  status	  quo,	  and	  all	  contained	  violent	  factions	  that	  utilized	  terrorism	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  their	  political	  objectives.	  In	  America,	  the	  Ku	  Klux	  Klan	  (specifically	  anti-­‐civil	  rights	  bombings	  in	  the	  1960s),	  Black	  Liberation	  Army	  (militant	  post-­‐Black	  Panther	  Party	  activists	  in	  the	  1970s),	  Anti-­‐
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Nassar,	  Jamal	  (2005)	  pp.	  23-­‐35	  	  8	  Nassar,	  Jamal	  (2005)	  p.	  35	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government	  extremists	  (Timothy	  McVeigh),	  and	  Christian	  fundamentalists	  (Eric	  Rudolph)	  have	  all	  utilized	  terrorism	  to	  protest	  perceived	  injustices	  and	  government	  complicity.	  9,10	  Their	  uses	  of	  violence	  against	  civilians	  were	  attempts	  to	  force	  change	  on	  the	  social	  and	  political	  order	  of	  the	  day.	  It	  is	  a	  safe	  assumption	  that	  there	  will	  always	  be	  disenfranchised	  individuals	  who	  are	  unsatisfied	  with	  the	  status	  quo	  and	  willing	  to	  commit	  violent	  acts	  in	  order	  to	  create	  change	  by	  destabilizing	  the	  presiding	  political	  order.	  As	  The	  Economist	  surmised	  in	  2005,	  “The	  Jihadists	  will	  go,	  but	  others	  will	  take	  the	  stage.”11	  The	  relevant	  debate	  for	  security	  strategists	  is	  whether	  modern	  Islamic	  terrorism	  poses	  new	  or	  unique	  threats	  that	  require	  innovative	  policy	  responses,	  or	  whether	  today’s	  terrorism	  is	  simply	  the	  continuation	  of	  a	  political	  and	  social	  reality	  that	  will	  persist	  regardless	  of	  policies	  enacted	  to	  prevent	  people	  from	  becoming	  terrorists.	  	  In	  his	  book	  “Old	  and	  New	  Terrorism”	  (2009),	  Peter	  Nuemann	  argues	  that	  terrorism	  evolved	  following	  the	  Cold	  War.	  Despite	  their	  political	  similarities,	  he	  characterizes	  “new”	  terrorism	  as	  differing	  from	  “old”	  in	  3	  distinct	  and	  important	  ways	  –	  structurally,	  ideologically,	  and	  methodologically.	  He	  first	  describes	  a	  structural	  shift	  away	  from	  vertical	  and	  army-­‐like	  hierarchies	  into	  horizontally	  oriented	  networks.	  The	  networks	  are	  less	  vulnerable	  than	  the	  rigid	  structure	  of	  “old”	  terrorism,	  and	  are	  formed	  mostly	  by	  independently	  operating	  cells.	  Organizational	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  9	  Gupta,	  Dipak	  (2006)	  Who	  Are	  the	  Terrorists?	  	  (The	  Roots	  of	  Terrorism).	  Chelsea	  House:	  New	  York,	  NY.	  (pp.	  14-­‐24)	  	  10	  Black	  Liberation	  Army.	  (2010).	  START	  (National	  consortium	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Terrorism	  And	  Responses	  to	  Terrorism)	  website.	  Retrieved	  online	  07/02/2013	  from:	  http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops/terrorist_organization_profile.asp?id=3708	  	  	  11	  Lessons	  from	  Anarchy:	  Today’s	  jihadists,	  like	  yesterday’s	  anarchists,	  will	  fade.	  Terrorism	  Won’t.	  (Aug.	  18th,	  2005)	  The	  
Economist.	  Retrieved	  online	  06/01/2013	  from:	  http://www.economist.com/node/4293225	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structure	  is	  well	  hidden	  within	  the	  networks,	  and	  cells	  are	  connected	  principally	  by	  ideology	  rather	  than	  function.	  12	  	  	  	  Nuemann	  also	  argues	  the	  character	  of	  fundamentalist	  ideologies	  that	  drive	  modern	  Islamic	  terrorism	  is	  unique	  in	  that	  it	  seeks	  to	  subvert	  the	  overtly	  political	  into	  a	  pre-­‐dominantly	  religious	  narrative	  (although	  he	  also	  notes	  that	  religious	  extremism	  was	  present	  in	  some	  “old”	  terrorist	  movements).13	  Although	  some	  radical	  movements	  in	  the	  past	  were	  de-­‐radicalized	  through	  negotiation	  and	  inclusion	  in	  the	  political	  process	  (the	  Irish	  Republican	  Army	  is	  a	  good	  example	  of	  this	  process),	  theologically	  based	  ideologies	  pose	  difficulties	  in	  this	  regard.14	  As	  conservative	  U.S.	  politician	  Barry	  Goldwater	  noted	  in	  a	  much-­‐referenced	  1981	  speech	  to	  the	  U.S.	  senate,	  “There	  is	  no	  position	  on	  which	  people	  are	  so	  immovable	  as	  their	  religious	  beliefs...	  	  [theologically-­‐drive	  political	  actors] believe	  they	  are	  acting	  in	  the	  name	  of	  God,	  so	  they	  can't	  and	  won't	  compromise.”15	  The	  application	  of	  this	  assertion	  to	  violent	  extremists	  can	  be	  challenged	  in	  a	  number	  of	  ways	  –	  this	  essay	  does	  so	  by	  identifying	  motivating	  factors	  other	  than	  ideology	  –	  but	  the	  assertion	  does	  provide	  accurate	  insight	  into	  the	  difficulties	  of	  de-­‐radicalizing	  Jihadist	  groups	  through	  political	  inclusion.	  While	  structural	  and	  ideological	  changes	  are	  important	  for	  understanding	  modern	  terrorism,	  perhaps	  the	  most	  important	  and	  impactful	  aspect	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Nuemann,	  Peter.	  (2009).	  Old	  Terrorism	  and	  New	  Terrorism:	  Late	  Modernity,	  Globalisation	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  Political	  
Violence.	  Polity	  Press:	  Malden,	  Ma.	  (pp.	  14-­‐49)	  	  13	  Nuemann,	  Peter.	  (2009).	  pp.	  14-­‐49	  	  14	  Dochartaigh,	  Naill.(2010).	  “Negotiated	  Deradicalization	  in	  the	  Irish	  Peace	  Process.”	  Unpublished	  draft	  for	  the	  School	  of	  Political	  Science	  and	  Sociology,	  National	  University	  of	  Ireland.	  Retrieved	  07/10/2013	  from:	  http://academia.edu/1203175/Negotiated_deradicalization_in_the_Irish_peace_process	  	  	  15	  Goldwater,	  Barry.	  (1981,	  Sept	  16)	  Speech	  made	  on	  the	  floor	  of	  the	  U.S.	  senate.	  Text	  retrieved	  online	  on	  July	  02,	  2013	  from:	  http://www.addictinginfo.org/2012/05/13/barry-­‐goldwaters-­‐war-­‐against-­‐the-­‐religious-­‐right/	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evolution	  from	  “old”	  to	  “new”	  is	  a	  change	  in	  methods.	  Terrorist	  groups	  in	  the	  past	  adhered	  to	  certain	  codes	  of	  conduct	  or	  norms	  regarding	  the	  selection	  of	  targets	  (targeting	  political	  figures,	  avoiding	  civilian	  targets,	  etc),	  but	  modern	  terrorism	  frequently	  targets	  large	  numbers	  of	  civilians.	  It	  chooses	  its	  targets	  based	  on	  the	  effect	  an	  attack	  might	  create	  in	  the	  collective	  psyche	  of	  its	  target	  audience,	  an	  effect	  enhanced	  tremendously	  if	  it	  can	  saturate	  global	  media	  coverage.16	  In	  one	  sense	  this	  evolution	  of	  method	  can	  be	  understood	  as	  simply	  using	  the	  available	  technological	  resources	  to	  amplify	  the	  message	  the	  act	  is	  meant	  to	  send,	  but	  Nuemann	  argues	  “media	  overload	  and	  emotional	  desensitization”	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  planning	  of	  attacks,	  and	  drive	  a	  cycle	  of	  increasing	  violence	  and	  “mass-­‐casualty	  terrorism.”17	  In	  this	  cycle,	  the	  grisly	  or	  spectacular	  nature	  of	  an	  attack	  makes	  it	  more	  attractive	  to	  a	  global	  media	  culture	  that	  thrives	  on	  sensationalism.	  Because	  media	  coverage	  is	  of	  primary	  importance	  to	  the	  attack’s	  effectiveness,	  operational	  planners	  are	  led	  to	  create	  spectacles	  more	  dramatic,	  horrific,	  and	  spectacular	  than	  preceding	  attacks	  in	  order	  to	  ensure	  their	  effects	  do	  not	  diminish	  over	  time.18	  	  Whereas	  “old”	  terrorism	  operated	  by	  an	  axiom	  that	  its	  practitioners	  “would	  rather	  have	  lots	  of	  people	  watching	  than	  lots	  of	  people	  dead,”	  the	  same	  does	  not	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  case	  for	  “new”	  terrorism.	  Mass	  casualty	  attacks	  on	  civilians	  and	  non-­‐combatants	  have	  become	  the	  norm,	  and	  although	  there	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  a	  successful	  attack	  using	  “weapons	  of	  mass	  destruction”	  (WMD),	  chemical,	  biological,	  radiological,	  and	  nuclear	  (CBRN)	  weapons	  are	  all	  openly	  pursued	  by	  Al	  Qaeda	  and	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  16	  Nuemann,	  Peter.	  (2009).	  pp.	  123-­‐127	  	  17	  Nuemann,	  Peter.	  (2009).	  pp.	  25-­‐28	  	  18	  Nuemann,	  Peter.	  (2009).	  pp.	  137-­‐146	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other	  terrorist	  organizations	  (however,	  the	  openness	  with	  which	  they	  pursue	  WMDs	  may	  also	  be	  a	  means	  to	  affect	  the	  psyche	  of	  their	  target	  populations).19	  The	  evolution	  of	  terrorism	  as	  a	  political	  phenomenon	  may	  be	  debatable,	  but	  what	  is	  clear	  is	  it	  has	  become	  more	  dangerous	  and	  more	  resistant	  to	  political	  compromise.	  Its	  methods	  have	  become	  more	  deadly	  at	  the	  same	  time	  its	  list	  of	  viable	  targets	  has	  expanded.	  Although	  suicide	  bombers	  and	  airplane	  hijackers	  make	  their	  greatest	  impact	  in	  the	  collective	  psyche,	  a	  successful	  attack	  using	  CBRN	  could	  threaten	  entire	  populations	  and	  destabilize	  political	  and	  economic	  systems	  on	  a	  global	  scale.	  	  Part	  II	  –	  Why	  Counter	  Radicalization	  Strategy?	  	  	  Kinetic	  actions	  undertaken	  in	  “The	  War	  on	  Terror”	  have	  to	  date	  prevented	  another	  large-­‐scale	  9/11-­‐style	  attack	  on	  American	  soil,	  but	  also	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  counter-­‐productive	  at	  minimizing	  the	  long-­‐term	  threat	  from	  Islamic	  terrorism.	  The	  number	  of	  radical	  Islamic	  groups	  who	  advocate	  or	  participate	  in	  terrorist	  actions	  has	  increased	  significantly	  since	  2001,	  and	  attacks	  from	  “homegrown”	  radicals	  like	  the	  recent	  Boston	  Marathon	  bombings	  are	  on	  the	  rise.	  The	  Rand	  Database	  for	  Worldwide	  Terrorist	  Incidents	  lists	  404	  attacks	  occurring	  in	  the	  Middle	  East	  and	  Southeast	  Asia	  during	  the	  year	  2000,	  but	  in	  2006	  that	  number	  had	  jumped	  to	  5,738	  –	  an	  increase	  of	  1300%.20	  Much	  of	  the	  increase	  can	  be	  attributed	  to	  resistance	  to	  U.S.	  combat	  operations	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  but	  the	  numbers	  are	  nonetheless	  indicative	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  traditional	  counter	  terrorism	  efforts	  have	  created	  more	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  19	  Nuemann,	  Peter.	  (2009).	  pp.	  25-­‐28	  	  20	  Rand	  Database	  of	  World	  Terrorist	  Incidents.	  Rand	  website.	  Retrieved	  Online	  on	  June	  02,	  2013	  from:	  	  http://www.rand.org/nsrd/projects/terrorism-­‐incidents.html	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terrorists	  than	  they	  have	  eliminated.	  The	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  who	  sympathize	  with	  Jihadists	  grew	  rapidly	  during	  the	  same	  period.	  In	  America	  the	  number	  of	  Muslims	  who	  perceived	  The	  War	  on	  Terror	  as	  a	  war	  against	  Islam	  (the	  fundamental	  precept	  of	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative)	  rose	  from	  18%	  in	  2001	  to	  55%	  in	  2007.	  A	  2009	  survey	  found	  similar	  results	  in	  other	  countries:	  the	  percentage	  of	  Muslims	  who	  felt	  1)	  Islam	  is	  under	  unjust	  attack	  from	  the	  West	  and	  2)	  sympathetic	  to	  the	  Jihadists	  desire	  to	  defend	  the	  faith	  ranged	  from	  62%	  in	  Indonesia	  to	  87%	  in	  Egypt.21	  The	  growing	  threat	  to	  the	  West	  from	  global	  Jihad	  appears	  to	  be	  related	  to	  growing	  acceptance	  of	  at	  least	  part	  of	  the	  Jihadist	  meta-­‐narrative	  within	  the	  Islamic	  societies	  and	  the	  spread	  of	  radical	  ideologies	  that	  propagate	  it.	  	  	  	   Some	  analysts	  researching	  preventative	  counter	  strategies	  argue	  against	  a	  policy	  focus	  on	  radicalization,	  and	  instead	  advocate	  focusing	  solely	  on	  those	  violent	  extremists	  who	  plan,	  execute,	  and	  provide	  material	  support	  for	  attacks.	  Marc	  Sageman	  (2011)	  argues	  that	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  violent	  extremism	  can	  be	  traced	  to	  small,	  disaffected,	  and	  outraged	  groups	  who	  evolve	  into	  terrorists	  through	  small	  group	  dynamics	  and	  isolated	  norm	  creation.	  He	  argues	  policy	  responses	  should	  focus	  on	  countering	  the	  creation	  of	  these	  isolated	  groups,	  and	  not	  the	  general	  trend	  of	  growing	  radicalization	  in	  Islamic	  societies.22	  This	  essay	  however,	  maintains	  there	  are	  several	  reasons	  to	  maintain	  a	  wider	  focus	  on	  radicalization.	  Sageman’s	  policy	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	  Leuprecht,	  C.,	  Hataley,	  T.,	  Muskalenko,	  S.,	  McCauley,	  C.	  (2009).“Winning	  the	  Battle	  but	  Losing	  the	  War?	  Narrative	  and	  Counter	  Narrative	  Strategy”	  in	  Perspectives	  on	  Terrorism	  vol.	  3,	  no.	  2.	  Found	  online	  on	  03/02/2013	  at	  http://terrorismanalysts.com/pt/index.php/pot/article/view/68/140	  	  	  22	  Sageman,	  Marc.	  (2011). Countering Extremist Violence. In	  Fenstermaker, Laurrie, and Todd Leventhal	  Fenstermaker, L., and 
Leventhal, T., (Eds.), Countering	  Violent	  Exremism:	  Scientific	  Methods	  and	  Strategies.	  TOPICAL STRATEGIC MULTI-LAYER 
ASSESSMENTAND AIR FORCE RESEARCH LABORATORY MULTI-DISCIPLINARY WHITE PAPERIN SUPPORT OF 
COUNTER-TERRORISM AND COUNTER-WMD. (pp. 29-35) Retrieved online on 03/26/13 from: 
http://www.nsiteam.com/pubs/U_Counter%20Violent%20Extremism%20Final_Approved%20for%20Public%20Release_28Oct11v3.
pdf	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recommendations	  for	  avoiding	  the	  creation	  of	  violent	  groups	  –	  namely	  to	  a)	  avoid	  repression,	  b)	  address	  discrimination,	  c)	  maintain	  consistency	  between	  action	  and	  rhetoric,	  d)	  construct	  effective	  counter	  messaging,	  and	  e)	  leverage	  controversies	  created	  by	  terrorist	  actions	  against	  Muslims	  –	  are	  (as	  will	  be	  discussed	  later	  in	  the	  third	  section)	  largely	  the	  same	  recommendations	  provided	  by	  wider	  counter	  radicalization	  strategies.23	  	  	   In	  addition,	  the	  U.S.	  State	  Department	  and	  prominent	  think	  tanks	  assess	  that	  “radicalization	  does	  not	  occur	  by	  accident,	  or	  because	  such	  populations	  are	  innately	  prone	  to	  extremism.”24	  Under	  both	  presidents	  Bush	  and	  Obama,	  analysts	  have	  presented	  a	  “conveyer-­‐belt”	  model	  in	  which	  ostensibly	  non-­‐violent	  radical	  groups	  use	  theology	  and	  rhetoric	  to	  push	  individuals	  towards	  violent	  extremism.25	  A	  2007	  strategic	  assessment	  describes	  the	  model	  as	  “terrorists	  seek[ing]	  to	  convert	  alienated	  or	  aggrieved	  populations,	  convert	  them	  to	  extremist	  viewpoints,	  and	  turn	  them,	  by	  stages,	  into	  sympathizers,	  supporters,	  and	  ultimately,	  members	  of	  terrorist	  networks.”26	  The	  growth	  of	  radical	  ideologies	  and	  prevalence	  of	  sympathizers	  to	  violent	  extremists	  within	  Islamic	  societies	  creates	  demand	  for	  strategy	  that	  addresses	  all	  segments	  of	  the	  ideological	  spectrum	  in	  which	  the	  Jihadist	  meta-­‐narrative	  is	  propagated.	   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  23Sageman,	  Marc	  (2011)	  	  (pp.	  29-­‐35)	  	  24	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State.	  (2007)	  Strategic	  Assessment.	  Office	  of	  the	  Coordinator	  for	  Counter	  Terrorism.	  Retrieved	  07/10/2013from:	  http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2006/82727.htm	  	  25	  Carpenter,	  J.S.,	  Levitt,	  M.,	  &	  Jacobson,	  M.	  (2010)	  “Confronting	  The	  Idea	  of	  Radical	  Extremism.”	  Journal	  of	  National	  Security	  
and	  Law	  Policy.	  Vol	  3,	  No.	  2	  (p.	  306).	  Retrieved	  online	  on	  05/25/2013	  from	  http://jnslp.com/wp-­‐content/uploads/2010/08/05_CARPENTER-­‐ET-­‐AL.pdf	  	  	  	  26	  U.S.	  Department	  of	  State	  (2007)	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Effective	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  also	  may	  serve	  as	  more	  than	  just	  a	  means	  to	  mitigate	  threats	  posed	  by	  Islamic	  terrorism.	  Both	  during	  and	  following	  the	  Cold	  War,	  America	  foreign	  policy	  has	  pushed	  an	  internationalist	  agenda	  that	  seeks	  to	  create	  global	  stability	  through	  economic	  integration	  and	  complex	  (albeit	  asymmetric	  in	  its	  favor)	  interdependence.27	  If	  pre-­‐9/11	  growth	  of	  radical	  fundamentalism	  and	  violent	  extremism	  were	  in	  part	  ideational	  responses	  to	  growing	  American	  hegemony	  and	  the	  encroachment	  of	  liberal	  cultural	  values	  upon	  traditional	  cultures	  and	  socio-­‐political	  hierarchies,	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts	  may	  provide	  utility	  to	  grand	  strategy	  by	  reducing	  popular	  resistance	  to	  global	  integration	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  interdependence	  between	  the	  West	  and	  the	  developing	  world.	  Cognitive	  approaches	  to	  counter	  radicalization	  may	  also	  provide	  utility	  to	  future	  foreign	  policy	  demands	  requiring	  ideational	  shifts	  in	  target	  cultures.	  	  Targeted	  cognitive	  approaches	  towards	  radicalization	  may	  meet	  with	  resistance	  among	  those	  who	  object	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  Western	  liberalism	  on	  neo-­‐colonial	  grounds.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  that	  one	  explanation	  for	  popular	  resistance	  to	  the	  spread	  of	  liberalism	  is	  the	  expectations	  gap	  mentioned	  by	  Nasser.	  The	  gulf	  between	  expectations	  set	  by	  rhetoric	  and	  experience	  delivered	  by	  policy	  has	  allowed	  for	  the	  prolific	  spread	  of	  anti-­‐Western	  narratives	  among	  Muslim	  populations	  in	  both	  the	  developing	  world	  and	  at	  home	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  depends	  heavily	  on	  minimizing	  that	  gap.	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  construction	  and	  successful	  propagation	  of	  credible	  alternatives	  to	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative	  depends	  largely	  on	  correcting	  many	  of	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  Layne,	  C.,	  and	  Schwartz,	  B.	  (1993).	  American	  Hegemony	  –	  Without	  and	  Enemy.	  Foreign	  Policy	  no.	  92,	  Fall	  1993.	  (pp.	  5-­‐23)	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discrepancies	  and	  contradictions	  communicated	  by	  U.S.	  (and	  European)	  foreign	  policies	  and	  actions.	  In	  this	  sense	  successful	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  will	  require	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  Western	  partners,	  if	  they	  desire	  complex	  interdependence	  to	  spread	  further	  among	  stable	  regimes,	  to	  regain	  their	  “power	  of	  attraction.”	  To	  accomplish	  this	  they	  must	  successfully	  validate	  and	  reinforce,	  through	  actions	  and	  policies,	  the	  rhetoric	  used	  to	  justify	  the	  global	  expansion	  of	  liberal	  integration	  and	  U.S.	  military	  presence	  that	  inspired	  the	  enmity	  of	  radical	  Islamists.	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  essay	  however,	  will	  remain	  on	  the	  causes	  and	  processes	  of	  radicalization	  and	  effective	  counter	  measures.
	  	  	  
Section	  II	  –	  The	  Mechanics	  of	  Radicalization	  
Part	  I	  -­‐	  How	  does	  radicalization	  occur?	  	  	   In	  order	  to	  formulate	  and	  implement	  effective	  counter	  radicalization	  strategies,	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  understand	  what	  causes	  and	  motivates	  radical	  operators.	  Understanding	  the	  social	  and	  cognitive	  mechanics	  of	  radicalization	  can	  help	  policy	  designers	  mitigate	  the	  factors	  that	  drive	  and	  draw	  individuals	  towards	  violent	  extremism	  and	  enable	  the	  spread	  of	  radical	  ideologies.	  The	  following	  section	  uses	  terminology	  from	  the	  work	  of	  Dr.	  Alex	  Schmidt	  of	  the	  International	  Center	  for	  Counter	  Terrorism	  in	  The	  Hauge	  to	  examine	  the	  radicalization	  process	  on	  three	  levels:	  the	  individual	  (micro),	  group	  (meso),	  and	  societal	  (macro).28	  	  	  	  
Micro-­‐level	  
	   Tom	  Rieger	  summarized	  research	  into	  radicalization	  on	  the	  micro-­‐level	  when	  he	  wrote	  simply,	  “Not	  all	  radicals	  are	  the	  same.”29	  There	  are	  differing	  theories	  explaining	  who	  is	  most	  at	  risk	  to	  radicalization	  and	  how	  it	  occurs.	  There	  is	  significant	  overlap	  among	  explanations,	  but	  the	  only	  real	  consensus	  among	  researchers	  is	  that	  the	  motivational	  matrix	  driving	  radical	  actors,	  and	  in	  particular	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  Schmidt,	  Alex	  (2013)	  pp.	  9-­‐11	  	  	  29	  Rieger,	  Tom	  (2011)	  Not	  All	  Radicals	  Are	  The	  Same:	  Implications	  for	  Counter	  Radicalization	  Strategy	  ICCT	  Reasearch	  Paper	  (pp	  24-­‐28).	  International	  Center	  For	  Counter	  Terrorism.	  Retrieved	  online	  05/15/2013	  from	  http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-­‐Schmid-­‐Radicalisation-­‐De-­‐Radicalisation-­‐Counter-­‐Radicalisation-­‐March-­‐2013.pdf	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the	  matrix	  driving	  violent	  extremists,	  is	  so	  varied	  and	  complex	  that	  it	  is	  impossible	  to	  type	  universal	  characteristics.	  Those	  most	  susceptible	  are	  frequently	  characterized	  as	  youths	  experiencing,	  in	  Schmidt’s	  words,	  	  
“Identity	  problems,	  failed	  integration,	  feelings	  of	  alienation,	  marginalization,	  discrimination,	  relative	  deprivation,	  humiliation	  (direct	  or	  by	  proxy),	  stigmatization	  and	  rejection,	  often	  combined	  with	  moral	  outrage	  and	  feelings	  of	  (vicarious)	  revenge.”30	  	  	  Here	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  socio-­‐economic	  deprivation	  in	  and	  of	  itself	  does	  not	  produce	  radicalization,	  although	  widespread	  deprivation	  appears	  necessary	  for	  radicalization	  to	  take	  root	  across	  large	  swaths	  of	  society.31	  Schmidt	  acknowledges	  the	  difficulties	  of	  typing	  terrorists	  and	  the	  wide	  variety	  of	  proposed	  classifications.	  Other	  researchers	  examine	  different	  personality	  types	  and	  ideological	  propagators	  (see	  Table	  1).	  The	  breadth	  of	  distinctions	  between	  types	  of	  individuals	  who	  engage	  in	  militant	  Jihad	  supports	  the	  assumption,	  made	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  that	  there	  always	  will	  be	  an	  element	  of	  society	  at	  risk	  to	  becoming	  violent	  political	  extremists.	  Examining	  micro-­‐level	  radicalization	  can	  however,	  provide	  utility	  to	  counter	  radicalization	  strategists.	  It	  provides	  insight	  into	  common	  grievances	  and	  types	  of	  personalities	  most	  often	  co-­‐opted	  through	  narrative	  into	  accepting	  radical	  and	  violent	  ideologies.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	  Schmidt,	  Alex	  (2013)	  p.	  4	  	  31	  Piazza,	  J.	  (2006)	  Rooted	  in	  Poverty?	  (Terrorism,	  Poor	  Economic	  Development,	  and	  Social	  Cleavages).	  Terrorism	  and	  Political	  
Violence,	  18:159–177	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Because	  each	  violent	  extremist	  may	  have	  complex	  motivations,	  counter	  strategies	  must	  address	  a	  variety	  of	  motivating	  factors	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  fashions.	  Often	  efforts	  must	  be	  tailored	  small	  audiences	  experiencing	  common	  conditions	  that	  lead	  to	  common	  but	  localized	  grievances,	  or	  further	  tailored	  to	  individual	  types	  of	  radicals	  within	  a	  localized	  audience.	  In	  other	  words,	  no	  single	  element	  of	  strategy	  will	  prove	  effective	  at	  countering	  radicalization	  across	  an	  entire	  target	  audience.	  Effective	  policies	  must	  be	  customized	  with	  specific	  knowledge	  of	  an	  audience	  and	  the	  political	  context	  in	  which	  a	  policy	  is	  being	  implemented.32	  In	  the	  final	  section	  of	  this	  essay,	  the	  utility	  of	  a	  dynamic	  strategic	  communications	  framework	  to	  successful	  development	  of	  customized	  policies	  will	  be	  examined	  in	  depth.	  	  	  
Meso-­‐level	  	   Schmidt	  characterizes	  the	  meso-­‐level	  as	  the	  “radical	  milieu,”	  meaning	  the	  specific	  social	  settings	  in	  which	  radicalized	  individuals	  and	  groups	  develop.	  Because	  those	  who	  introduce	  and	  propagate	  radical	  norms	  hold	  positions	  of	  relative	  authority	  and	  influence	  (often	  religious	  leaders)	  and	  yet	  individually	  influence	  only	  small	  pockets	  of	  society,	  radical	  norms	  can	  be	  seen	  as	  conforming	  to	  both	  top-­‐down	  and	  bottom-­‐up	  models	  of	  normative	  change.33	  Preventing	  radicalization	  and	  violent	  extremism	  on	  the	  meso-­‐level	  is	  best	  conceived	  as	  an	  effort	  to	  influence	  the	  creation	  and	  adoption	  of	  norms	  within	  groups	  at-­‐risk	  to	  indoctrination	  by	  radical	  ideologies.	  In	  order	  to	  prevent	  the	  spread	  of	  radical	  norms,	  those	  who	  introduce	  and	  propagate	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  Cornish,	  P.,	  et	  all.	  (2011)	  p.	  9	  	  	  33	  Finnemore,	  M.,	  Sikkink,	  K.	  (1998).	  International	  Norm	  Dynamics	  and	  Political	  Change.	  In	  International	  Organization,	  vol.	  52,	  no.4,	  Autumn	  (pp	  887-­‐917).	  Cambridge,	  Mass:	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  MIT	  Press.	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radical	  change	  must	  be	  ideationally	  delegitimized.	  In	  addition,	  alternate,	  non-­‐radical	  norms	  must	  be	  propagated	  in	  order	  to	  compete	  and	  prevent	  radical	  ideas	  from	  reaching	  a	  “tipping	  point”	  within	  groups	  into	  which	  they	  are	  introduced.	  These	  two	  steps	  correspond	  to	  counter	  narrative	  (delegitimization)	  and	  alternate	  narrative	  (competition)	  strategies.	  Analyzing	  the	  growth	  of	  radical	  groups	  within	  Islamic	  societies,	  Dipak	  Gupta	  stresses	  the	  importance	  of	  group	  psychology	  on	  individual	  decision-­‐making	  processes.	  He	  argues	  it	  is	  natural	  human	  behavior	  for	  individuals	  to	  crave	  belonging	  in	  a	  group,	  and	  once	  in	  the	  group	  to	  derive	  utility	  from	  adhering	  to	  its	  rules	  and	  norms.	  By	  emphasizing	  the	  critical	  role	  of	  ‘political	  entrepreneurs’	  (read	  norm	  introducers),	  he	  explains	  how	  new,	  radical	  norms	  are	  introduced	  and	  take	  root	  in	  religious	  groups	  that	  form	  around	  them.34	  Group	  affiliation	  is	  desirable	  because	  individuals	  establish	  identity	  through	  membership	  and	  group	  activities	  –	  in	  terrorist	  organizations	  participants	  become	  the	  person	  they	  want	  to	  be	  through	  their	  membership	  in	  the	  group.	  As	  a	  result,	  “when	  an	  idea	  gains	  momentum,	  the	  number	  of	  people	  seeking	  its	  affiliation	  by	  being	  part	  of	  the	  community	  increases.”35	  	  This	  explains	  why	  as	  radicalism	  began	  to	  spread	  in	  Muslim	  communities,	  it	  also	  gained	  momentum,	  which	  served	  to	  further	  increase	  the	  attractiveness	  of	  its	  ideology	  and	  indoctrinate	  ever-­‐growing	  numbers.	  The	  concept	  of	  self-­‐reinforcing	  and	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accelerating	  momentum	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  a	  “normative	  cascade”	  that	  occurs	  after	  an	  idea	  reaches	  a	  “tipping	  point”	  in	  models	  of	  normative	  change.36	  	  Eventually	  many	  radicalized	  groups	  isolate	  themselves	  from	  wider	  social	  discourse	  as	  a	  means	  to	  defend	  against	  infiltration	  and	  conflicting	  ideologies.	  Communication	  between	  members	  can	  then	  become	  an	  echo	  chamber	  serving	  to	  affirm	  and	  validate	  the	  group’s	  beliefs.	  This	  process,	  commonly	  referred	  to	  as	  groupthink,	  can	  internalize	  increasingly	  radical	  norms	  and	  lead	  to	  extremism	  and	  eventually	  terrorist	  activity.37	  For	  individuals	  radicalized	  to	  violent	  extremism	  within	  the	  U.S.,	  the	  radical	  milieu	  is	  contained	  almost	  entirely	  in	  the	  virtual	  world.	  During	  a	  May,	  2013	  panel	  discussion	  on	  the	  myths	  and	  realities	  of	  online	  radicalization,	  Peter	  Nuemann,	  Director	  of	  Security	  Studies	  and	  The	  International	  Centre	  for	  the	  Study	  of	  Radicalization	  at	  King's	  College	  London,	  argues	  that	  those	  radicalized	  in	  the	  U.S.	  are	  not	  normally	  “lone	  wolfs,”	  but	  rather	  members	  of	  a	  vast	  and	  vibrant	  online	  community.38	  For	  this	  reason,	  he	  argues	  a	  majority	  of	  preventative	  domestic	  counter	  efforts	  should	  focus	  on	  greater	  understanding	  and	  more	  effective	  use	  of	  online	  footprints	  and	  virtual	  networks.	  The	  meso-­‐level	  is	  the	  most	  cognitively	  delicate	  and	  tedious	  arena	  for	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  implemented	  by	  governments.	  A	  completely	  successful	  strategy	  would	  stop	  radical	  norms	  from	  reaching	  a	  tipping	  point	  and	  facilitate	  a	  wider	  acceptance	  of	  “non-­‐radical”	  norms,	  effectively	  countering	  the	  spread	  of	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radical	  ideas	  within	  targeted	  groups.	  However,	  it	  is	  unrealistic	  to	  believe	  government	  efforts	  can	  be	  highly	  effective	  or	  influential	  in	  this	  regard.	  Enlisting	  moderate	  partners	  and	  creating	  stakeholders	  within	  Muslim	  communities	  is	  therefore	  vitally	  important	  to	  this	  effort.	  If	  a	  government	  does	  chooses	  to	  engage	  an	  audience	  through	  means	  other	  than	  moderate	  proxies,	  the	  precision	  with	  which	  messages	  are	  communicated	  at	  the	  meso-­‐level	  is	  paramount.	  39	  Poorly	  conceived	  or	  executed	  messages	  are	  counter-­‐productive	  and	  risk	  being	  co-­‐opted	  to	  support	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative	  that	  the	  West	  is	  trying	  to	  destroy	  Islam.	  	  
Macro	  Level	  	   Macro-­‐level	  analysis	  corresponds	  to	  the	  dissemination	  of	  radical	  ideology	  across	  larger	  swaths	  of	  Islamic	  societies.	  Macro-­‐level	  factors	  are	  widely	  experienced	  social	  and	  political	  conditions	  that	  may	  create	  cognitive	  openings	  for	  radicalization	  to	  spread.	  These	  conditions	  may	  result	  from	  the	  role	  of	  governments,	  public	  opinion,	  tensions	  in	  majority-­‐minority	  relations	  (this	  is	  an	  especially	  significant	  condition	  in	  cases	  of	  ethnic	  diaspora),	  or	  a	  scarcity	  of	  opportunities	  for	  social	  and	  economic	  advancement.40	  	  Effective	  counter	  strategies	  on	  this	  level	  would	  create	  economic	  and	  social	  wellbeing,	  provide	  political	  choices,	  mitigate	  repression	  and	  discrimination,	  and	  engage	  in	  credible	  and	  precise	  public	  diplomacy.	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Marketing	  of	  the	  Jihadist	  Meta-­‐Narrative	  Gupta’s	  theoretical	  perspective	  on	  how	  radicalism	  has	  spread	  within	  Islam	  combines	  ideational	  theory	  of	  normative	  change	  and	  group	  dynamics	  with	  narrative	  theory	  and	  commercial	  marketing	  strategies.	  He	  identifies	  three	  types	  of	  political	  entrepreneurs	  fundamental	  to	  the	  successful	  creation	  of	  norms	  associated	  with	  radicalization.	  He	  cites	  Malcom	  Gladwell’s	  “archetypes	  of	  social	  epidemics”	  when	  defining	  them	  as	  connectors,	  mavens,	  and	  salesmen.41	  	  The	  role	  of	  connector	  represents	  the	  primary	  nodes	  of	  radical	  networks.	  These	  are	  people	  that	  have	  an	  established	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  network,	  and	  are	  known	  to	  many	  because	  of	  their	  position,	  money,	  and	  power.	  Osama	  Bin	  Laden	  is	  an	  example	  of	  a	  connector	  –	  he	  facilitated	  the	  meeting	  of	  logistic,	  financial,	  and	  ideological	  elements	  to	  enable	  a	  radical	  group	  to	  mobilize	  and	  act.42	  Connectors	  also	  serve	  to	  bridge	  societal	  pockets	  in	  which	  radical	  norms	  have	  taken	  root,	  creating	  networks	  and	  enabling	  ideologies	  to	  disseminate	  across	  large	  swaths	  of	  a	  population	  from	  within.	  	  The	  second	  type,	  the	  mavens,	  is	  comprised	  of	  theoreticians,	  theologians,	  and	  the	  providers	  of	  ideology.	  Mavens	  formulate	  intellectual	  and	  theological	  rationale	  for	  radical	  action.	  They	  are	  often	  Imams,	  and	  they	  construct	  the	  narrative	  in	  which	  radical	  norms	  are	  contextualized.43	  They	  create	  the	  messages	  propagated	  to	  target	  demographics	  within	  their	  own	  and	  other	  Muslim	  societies,	  and	  have	  proven	  to	  be	  highly	  effective	  strategic	  communicators	  in	  their	  own	  right.	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The	  third	  type,	  the	  salesmen,	  rely	  on	  personal	  charisma	  and	  persuasion	  to	  attract	  followers	  to	  the	  message.	  Mullahs	  or	  charismatic	  individuals	  often	  fill	  this	  role,	  but	  in	  reality	  individuals	  who	  may	  fulfill	  more	  than	  one	  often	  blur	  the	  distinction	  between	  the	  three	  roles.	  What	  is	  important	  to	  conceptualize	  is	  how	  the	  meta-­‐narrative	  is	  constructed,	  packaged,	  and	  marketed	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  maximizes	  “sales”	  and	  the	  normalization	  of	  both	  radical	  and	  violent	  norms.44	  Ideology	  is	  conceived,	  produced,	  and	  marketed	  by	  these	  three	  archetypes.	  	  Counter	  efforts	  from	  moderate	  partner	  organizations	  within	  Islamic	  communities	  may	  benefit	  by	  the	  identification	  of	  individuals	  who	  fill	  these	  roles.	  However,	  within	  virtual	  communities	  many	  content	  consumers	  are	  also	  content	  creators,	  so	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  ascribe	  specific	  roles	  to	  members	  of	  an	  online	  community	  or	  group.45	  This	  vagueness	  is	  consistent	  with	  findings	  that	  indicate	  there	  are	  multiple	  mechanisms	  for	  radicalization,	  and	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  control	  or	  eliminate	  it	  by	  controlling	  or	  eliminating	  one	  mechanism.46	  Here	  it	  is	  important	  to	  remember	  the	  earlier	  finding	  that	  no	  single	  element	  of	  strategy	  will	  effectively	  counter	  radicalization	  across	  an	  entire	  target	  audience.	  Rather,	  policy	  groups	  must	  be	  conceived	  as	  parts	  of	  a	  whole,	  and	  implemented	  cohesively	  as	  individual	  elements	  of	  a	  unified	  and	  multi-­‐faceted	  strategy.	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Part	  II	  –	  The	  Terrorism	  Equation:	  Grievance,	  Ideology,	  and	  Mobilization	  Despite	  many	  classifications	  or	  “types”	  of	  terrorist	  actor	  and	  several	  models	  of	  radicalization,	  most	  research	  converges	  on	  a	  fundamental	  troika	  necessary	  for	  terrorist	  actions	  to	  occur:	  grievances,	  ideology,	  and	  mobilization.47Because	  counter	  mobilization	  efforts	  are	  largely	  kinetic	  operations	  in	  response	  to	  existing	  threats,	  this	  essay	  focuses	  mainly	  on	  strategies	  to	  prevent	  and	  mitigate	  the	  first	  two	  factors	  in	  the	  troika.	  The	  manner	  in	  which	  grievance	  and	  ideology	  interact	  is	  simple,	  yet	  dynamic.	  Peter	  Nuemann	  argues	  that	  “without	  grievance,	  ideology	  does	  not	  resonate,	  while	  without	  ideology,	  grievances	  are	  not	  acted	  upon.”48	  	  Most	  radical	  ideologies	  explain	  the	  personal	  grievances	  of	  Muslims	  as	  exclusively	  and	  completely	  the	  fault	  of	  Western	  persecution	  of	  the	  Muslim	  faith.	  A	  political	  and	  social	  order	  derived	  from	  fundamentally	  “pure”	  Islam	  is	  presented	  as	  the	  solution	  that	  will	  end	  the	  underlying	  causes	  of	  all	  grievances.	  Often	  this	  utopian	  vision	  is	  characterized	  as	  a	  return	  to	  the	  “Golden	  Age	  of	  Islam”	  –	  a	  mythologized	  period	  spanning	  the	  first	  four	  caliphates	  of	  Islamic	  political	  and	  social	  rule	  on	  the	  Arabian	  Peninsula	  and	  Northern	  Africa.49	  Within	  this	  narrative,	  the	  West	  is	  labeled	  an	  aggressor	  in	  a	  war	  against	  Islam	  in	  which	  it	  seeks	  to	  destroy	  the	  faith,	  happiness,	  and	  piety	  of	  Muslims.	  The	  war	  is	  evidenced	  by	  Western	  support	  for	  Israel,	  a	  continuing	  presence	  of	  Western	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  LaFree,	  G.,	  Ackerman,	  G.,	  (2009)	  The	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  Terrorism:	  Social	  and	  Legal	  Research	  Annual	  Review	  of	  Law	  and	  Social	  Science	  Vol.	  5:	  347-­‐374	  	  48	  Nuemann,	  Peter	  (2011)	  Summary	  of	  debate	  from	  policy	  luncheon	  at	  The	  Washington	  Institute.	  Jan	  5,	  2011.	  Retrieved	  online	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  Thompson,	  Steven	  R	  (2012)	  Countering	  the	  Narrative:	  Combatting	  the	  Ideology	  of	  Radical	  Islam.	  U.S.	  Navy	  War	  College.	  Retrieved	  Online	  04/21/2013	  from:	  http://www.usnwc.edu/Lucent/OpenPdf.aspx?id=130&title=Perspective	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militaries	  in	  traditionally	  Muslim-­‐populated	  lands,	  and	  combat	  operations	  that	  have	  killed	  large	  amounts	  of	  Muslims	  in	  Iraq	  and	  Afghanistan,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  Pakistan.	  Within	  this	  war,	  every	  Muslim	  should	  engage	  in	  Jihad	  against	  forces	  that	  seek	  to	  harm	  Islam	  –	  namely	  the	  West	  and	  its	  allies.	  Terrorist	  actions	  are	  justified	  and	  it	  is	  the	  duty	  of	  all	  Muslims,	  if	  they	  do	  not	  engage	  in	  militant	  Jihad	  themselves,	  to	  support	  the	  efforts	  of	  those	  who	  do.50	  This	  story	  is	  simple,	  powerful,	  and	  effective	  at	  attracting	  disaffected	  members	  of	  Muslim	  communities.	  It	  explains	  a	  complex	  world	  in	  simple	  terms	  and	  prescribes	  a	  specific	  course	  of	  action	  to	  produce	  an	  ultimate	  solution.	  It	  is	  certainly	  not	  the	  first	  ideology	  to	  gain	  popularity	  by	  promoting	  simple	  solutions	  to	  complex	  problems.	  The	  difficult	  challenge	  for	  preventative	  strategists	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  Europe,	  and	  elsewhere	  is	  how	  to	  effectively	  counter	  the	  narrative	  while	  offering	  a	  credible	  alternative?	  The	  U.S.	  government	  is	  viewed	  with	  suspicion	  and	  contempt,	  if	  not	  hatred,	  in	  most	  of	  the	  Muslim	  world	  and	  lacks	  theological	  legitimacy.	  How	  then,	  should	  the	  West	  engage	  and	  communicate	  with	  Islamic	  populations?	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  Thompson,	  Steven	  R	  (2012)	  p.	  18	  
	  	  	  
Section	  III	  –	  Review	  of	  Counter	  Efforts	  	  
Part	  I	  –	  Recommended	  Policy	  Responses	  	  	   Tawfik	  Hamid	  argues	  the	  key	  for	  improving	  the	  image	  of	  the	  West	  in	  the	  Muslim	  world	  is	  not	  a	  change	  in	  policies,	  but	  simply	  a	  change	  in	  the	  manner	  in	  which	  those	  policies	  are	  perceived.	  51	  While	  that	  argument	  is	  consistent	  with	  findings	  that	  indicate	  narrative-­‐based	  strategies	  are	  fundamental	  to	  mitigating	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  radicalization,	  it	  does	  not	  consider	  that	  macro-­‐level	  grievances	  may	  create	  cognitive	  openings	  for	  radical	  narratives.	  Nor	  does	  it	  consider	  that	  some	  policies	  may	  affect	  the	  way	  other	  policies	  are	  perceived.	  Evelyn	  Early’s	  research	  finds	  public	  opinion	  of	  the	  U.S.	  on	  the	  Arab	  street	  is	  “based	  on	  American	  actions,	  not	  American	  ability	  to	  craft	  a	  narrative,”	  and	  nearly	  every	  study	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  stresses	  a	  fundamental	  need	  to	  synchronize	  government	  actions	  with	  rhetoric.	  52	  In	  other	  words,	  to	  change	  the	  perception	  of	  the	  West	  in	  Islamic	  societies,	  the	  U.S.	  has	  to	  change	  its	  policies.	  However,	  current	  research	  also	  recommends	  that	  improving	  the	  West’s	  image	  should	  not	  be	  included	  in	  counter	  radicalization	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objectives;	  rather,	  they	  should	  include	  improving	  the	  image	  of	  Islamic	  moderates,	  and	  discrediting	  the	  image	  of	  radical	  leaders.53	  	  	   To	  mitigate	  the	  threat	  posed	  by	  violent	  extremists,	  research	  examined	  in	  the	  previous	  section	  suggested	  grievance	  and	  radical	  ideology	  must	  be	  addressed,	  and	  the	  link	  between	  them	  disrupted.	  Accordingly,	  a	  majority	  of	  policy	  recommendations	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  roughly	  two	  categories:	  those	  that	  attempt	  to	  mitigate	  grievances	  and	  those	  that	  combat	  radical	  ideologies.	  	  There	  is	  crossover	  between	  these	  categories	  because	  some	  policies	  serve	  both	  purposes.	  Grievance-­‐related	  policies	  should	  be	  conceived,	  developed,	  and	  implemented	  in	  the	  context	  of	  constructing	  a	  credible	  alternative	  to	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative.	  Whether	  the	  alternate	  narrative	  is	  more	  effectively	  communicated	  by	  U.S.	  actions	  or	  the	  words	  of	  its	  moderate	  partners	  should	  not	  affect	  policy	  development	  or	  the	  actions	  themselves.	  	  	  
Grievances	  	   The	  first	  section	  of	  this	  essay	  emphasized	  that	  no	  set	  of	  policies	  can	  alleviate	  all	  grievances	  for	  all	  people	  across	  a	  given	  society.	  However,	  it	  is	  frequently	  argued	  that	  grievances	  resulting	  from	  macro-­‐level	  conditions	  can	  be	  mitigated	  by	  development	  and	  political	  reform.54	  What	  these	  policy	  objectives	  aim	  to	  provide	  are	  stability	  and	  choices	  to	  individuals	  within	  a	  society.	  It	  is	  tempting	  to	  believe	  successful	  development	  policies,	  economic	  growth,	  and	  political	  reform	  can	  root	  themselves	  in	  any	  society	  and	  lessen	  repressive	  social	  structures	  and	  perceptions	  of	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  “Rewriting	  the	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  An	  Integrated	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  Counterradicalization”	  (2009)	  Presidential	  Task	  Force	  on	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  The	  Ideology	  of	  Radical	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  The	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  Online	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inequity.	  But	  it	  is	  important	  to	  view	  the	  development	  of	  Muslim	  societies	  in	  their	  own	  respective	  contexts,	  and	  not	  project	  upon	  them	  a	  progression	  mirroring	  the	  self-­‐perceived	  development	  of	  secular,	  Western	  societies.	  	  
 In	  her	  paper	  “Prevention	  of	  Violent	  Extremism:	  ‘What	  are	  the	  People	  Saying?’”	  (2011),	  Alexis	  Everington	  argues	  that	  despite	  a	  high	  level	  of	  “religiosity”	  in	  most	  Muslim	  societies,	  moderate	  ideologies	  and	  supportive	  Islamic	  communities	  may	  serve	  as	  decidedly	  positive	  factors	  for	  mitigating	  the	  growth	  and	  potency	  of	  violent	  groups.55	  Nader	  Hashemi,	  the	  Director	  of	  the	  Center	  for	  Middle	  East	  Studies	  at	  the	  University	  of	  Denver,	  ascribes	  high	  levels	  of	  religiosity	  to	  “post-­‐colonial	  failures”	  and	  having	  “long	  been	  under	  authoritarian	  rule	  where	  the	  basic	  rules	  of	  society	  have	  not	  yet	  been	  negotiated.”	  He	  adds,	  “this	  applies	  especially	  to	  the	  normative	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  public	  life,	  which	  is	  only	  beginning	  to	  be	  debated	  in	  the	  Arab	  world."	  56	  	  
	   Both	  Hashemi	  and	  Everington’s	  identify	  religion	  as	  a	  fundamentally	  important	  and	  unavoidable	  factor	  that	  will	  influence	  political	  and	  social	  development	  in	  most	  Muslim	  societies	  for	  the	  foreseeable	  future.	  Everington	  argues	  collectivist	  and	  anti-­‐materialistic	  social	  norms	  may	  make	  efforts	  to	  develop	  urbanized,	  individualistic	  societies	  counter-­‐productive.	  Development	  aid	  must	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therefore	  be	  provided	  as	  each	  community	  “desires	  or	  requires	  it,	  and	  not	  as	  we	  think	  it	  should	  be	  provided.”57	  	  
Policies	  must	  be	  responsive	  and	  customized	  to	  localized	  audiences	  in	  order	  to	  alleviate	  common	  grievances	  resulting	  from	  political,	  social,	  or	  economic	  issues.	  They	  must	  be	  implemented	  in	  a	  way	  that	  is	  synergistic	  with	  community	  needs	  and	  desires.	  Research	  indicates	  even	  among	  Jihadists,	  local	  and	  regional	  concerns	  consistently	  outweigh	  global	  ideology	  as	  motivating	  or	  demotivating	  factors.58	  Knowledge	  of	  local	  cultures,	  actors,	  and	  specific	  political	  contexts	  are	  fundamental	  to	  success	  in	  this	  area	  of	  counter	  radicalization.	  	  Historically,	  the	  difficulties	  of	  developing	  and	  implementing	  effective	  localized	  policies	  arise	  when	  configuring	  them	  with	  global	  and	  regional	  policies	  –	  or	  even	  the	  localized	  policies	  of	  other	  agencies,	  units,	  or	  organizations.	  Frequently,	  the	  implementation	  of	  one	  policy	  may	  contradict	  the	  objectives	  and	  intended	  message	  of	  another.59	  To	  overcome	  this	  dilemma,	  military	  commanders,	  diplomats,	  analysts,	  policy	  developers,	  NGO	  employees,	  moderate	  partners	  –	  every	  individual	  who	  implements	  any	  aspect	  of	  policy	  –	  must	  come	  to	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  narrative	  driven	  strategy	  and	  the	  need	  for	  policy	  cohesion	  in	  all	  respects.	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Entering	  Partnerships	  and	  Creating	  Stakeholders	  among	  Moderates	  
	   Both	  radical	  and	  moderate	  Islamic	  ideologies	  conjoin	  religion	  and	  politics	  –	  any	  debate	  regarding	  one	  necessarily	  involves	  the	  other.	  Because	  Western	  governments	  lack	  theological	  legitimacy	  in	  religious	  matters,	  they	  are	  hindered	  from	  engaging	  in	  popular	  discourse	  regarding	  either.	  Developing	  partnerships	  with	  moderate	  Muslim	  NGOs	  and	  creating	  moderate	  stakeholders	  within	  Muslim	  communities	  is	  one	  of	  two	  complementary	  approaches	  recommended	  for	  solving	  this	  problem.	  Partners	  and	  stakeholders	  can	  engage	  local	  Muslims	  directly	  on	  theological	  and	  political	  issues	  and	  may	  combat	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative	  far	  more	  effectively	  than	  Western	  governments.60	  However,	  partner	  organizations	  must	  be	  perceived	  by	  local	  populations	  as	  operating	  independently	  from	  government	  control	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  legitimacy	  and	  influence.	  In	  the	  past,	  outreach	  and	  development	  projects	  perceived	  as	  proxies	  for	  Western	  governments	  have	  alienated	  local	  communities	  both	  domestically	  and	  internationally.	  The	  effectiveness	  of	  what	  otherwise	  might	  be	  successful	  development	  projects	  has	  been	  undercut	  by	  the	  withdrawal	  of	  community	  support.61	  Partners	  must	  be	  carefully	  vetted	  and	  chosen	  wisely	  (in	  several	  instances,	  organizations	  funded	  by	  preventative	  efforts	  in	  the	  UK	  have	  later	  been	  found	  to	  reinforce	  radicalization	  62),	  and	  yet	  both	  partners	  and	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  M.	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stakeholders	  must	  be	  allowed	  to	  pursue	  their	  own	  agendas	  free	  of	  government	  interference.	  	  
	   	  Threats	  posed	  by	  violent	  extremists	  require	  a	  pro-­‐active	  response	  from	  Western	  governments.	  However,	  governments	  should	  monitor	  the	  progress	  of	  moderate	  influences	  and	  independent	  proxies	  within	  Muslim	  societies,	  and	  be	  conscious	  of	  risks	  associated	  with	  careless	  messaging.	  In	  the	  words	  of	  Brigadier	  Gen.	  Jack	  Shanahan,	  it	  is	  “essential	  to	  ensure	  that	  strategies	  do	  not	  create	  more	  problems	  than	  they	  solve.”63	  	  	  Part	  II	  –	  Countering	  Ideology	  	  
Providing	  Credible	  Alternate	  Narratives	  	  	  	   	  One	  of	  the	  most	  frequent	  recommendations	  from	  policy	  researchers	  calls	  for	  the	  U.S.	  to	  narrow	  the	  gap	  between	  its	  rhetoric	  and	  actions	  when	  dealing	  with	  other	  countries	  and	  populations.	  Within	  the	  military,	  the	  difference	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  action	  is	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘say-­‐do’	  gap,	  and	  in	  the	  ‘battle	  for	  hearts	  and	  minds,’	  it	  has	  become	  an	  increasingly	  important	  policy	  driver	  within	  theatres	  of	  operation.64	  In	  one	  sense,	  its	  growing	  importance	  within	  the	  military	  is	  a	  positive	  sign	  because	  it	  demonstrates	  both	  cognizance	  of	  a	  narrative	  deficit	  between	  words	  and	  deeds,	  and	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  Retrieved	  Online	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acknowledgment	  of	  local	  populations’	  concerns	  and	  their	  importance	  to	  both	  mission	  and	  long-­‐term	  policy	  objectives.	  Yet	  in	  another	  sense,	  the	  increasing	  focus	  on	  the	  gap	  between	  words	  and	  actions	  highlights	  a	  very	  large	  and	  complex	  problem:	  how	  can	  local,	  regional,	  and	  international	  policies	  –	  designed	  to	  produce	  security,	  economic	  growth,	  political	  reform,	  civic	  development,	  social	  inclusion,	  and	  cultural	  sensitivity	  –	  be	  implemented	  without	  undercutting	  one	  another?	  The	  demands	  of	  one	  policy	  initiative	  often	  contradict	  the	  demands	  of	  others.	  In	  a	  2006	  paper	  for	  the	  Information	  Operations	  journal	  IO	  Sphere,	  Richard	  Josten	  wrote	  that	  the	  U.S.	  government	  was	  remarkably	  vast	  and	  its	  agencies	  were	  separated	  to	  a	  large	  degree	  by	  conflicting	  policies	  and	  intra-­‐organizational	  goals.	  He	  argued	  the	  government	  was	  in	  dire	  need	  of	  a	  revamped	  strategic	  communications	  framework	  to	  synchronize	  the	  messages	  it	  sent	  and	  halt	  an	  epidemic	  of	  “informational	  fratricide”	  (so	  named	  after	  “missile	  fratricide,”	  in	  which	  two	  missiles	  collide	  mid-­‐air	  and	  neither	  hits	  their	  intended	  targets).65	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  final	  section	  will	  address	  this	  conundrum	  and	  what	  has	  been	  done,	  and	  can	  still	  be	  done,	  to	  correct	  it.	  	  	  	  
Countering	  Ideology	  –	  Counter	  Narrative	  Strategy	  Counter	  narrative	  strategy	  requires	  engaging	  an	  audience	  directly	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  discredit	  radical	  and	  Jihadist	  ideologies.	  Although	  most	  effectively	  pursued	  by	  moderate	  leadership	  within	  Islamic	  communities,	  Western	  governments	  also	  engage	  in	  counter	  narrative	  operations.	  These	  include	  both	  public	  diplomacy	  (speeches,	  scholarship	  exchange,	  etc)	  and	  growing	  efforts	  to	  engage	  at-­‐risk	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populations	  in	  “new”	  media	  platforms	  –	  i.e.	  web	  sites,	  chat	  rooms,	  social	  networks,	  micro	  blogging,	  YouTube,	  etc.66	  Because	  it	  lacks	  theological	  legitimacy,	  government-­‐led	  efforts	  must	  avoid	  religious	  debate	  and	  focus	  on	  delegitimizing	  radical	  leaders	  by	  attacking	  the	  logic	  of	  their	  claims	  with	  empirical	  evidence,	  humor,	  and	  even	  derision.	  One	  typical	  “talking	  point”	  challenges	  the	  claim	  Jihadists	  are	  defending	  Islam	  against	  the	  west	  by	  pointing	  out	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Al	  Qaeda’s	  victims	  have	  been	  Muslim.67	  Highlighting	  discrepancies	  within	  the	  narratives	  and	  exploiting	  fissures	  within	  jihadist	  movements	  are	  tactics	  recommended	  by	  the	  growing	  body	  of	  research	  published	  in	  recent	  years.68	   	  During	  a	  2012	  lecture	  on	  international	  terrorism,	  Dr.	  Paul	  Cornish,	  former	  Head	  of	  International	  Security	  at	  Chatham	  House	  and	  currently	  Professor	  of	  Strategic	  Studies	  at	  Exeter,	  observed	  that	  in	  surveillance	  footage	  of	  the	  2008	  terrorist	  attacks	  in	  Mumbai,	  one	  of	  the	  attackers	  looked	  ‘cool.’	  He	  explained	  his	  concern	  was	  that	  the	  terrorist	  knew	  his	  appearance	  would	  be	  broadcast	  across	  the	  world	  and	  sought	  to	  project	  an	  attractive	  image	  to	  those	  who	  might	  view	  the	  footage.69	  The	  implication	  was	  that	  terrorist	  organizations	  are	  marketing	  themselves	  through	  videos	  of	  their	  attacks,	  much	  like	  Western	  marketing	  firms	  use	  models	  to	  sell	  products	  in	  TV	  commercials.	  Terrorists’	  efforts	  to	  market	  their	  organizations	  through	  television	  and	  new	  media	  indicate	  the	  spread	  of	  violent	  extremism	  is	  at	  least	  partly	  dependent	  on	  its	  ability	  to	  sell	  itself	  through	  media.	  An	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interesting	  aspect	  of	  counter	  narrative	  strategy	  is	  the	  use	  of	  media	  and	  marketing	  techniques	  to	  both	  challenge	  radical	  narratives	  and	  facilitate	  greater	  social	  cohesion	  in	  Muslim	  communities	  –	  a	  “social	  buffer”	  that	  can	  negatively	  affect	  the	  recruitment	  and	  mobilization	  of	  extremist	  groups.	  
	  	  	  
Section	  IV	  –	  Strategic	  Communications	  
Section	  Introduction	  The	  first	  three	  sections	  of	  this	  essay,	  respectively,	  have	  explained	  the	  need	  for	  a	  preventative	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy,	  examined	  the	  cognitive	  processes	  and	  social	  mechanics	  of	  radicalization,	  and	  reviewed	  current	  research	  on	  prospective	  policy	  responses.	  Policy	  recommendations	  have	  been	  placed	  in	  the	  context	  of	  either	  alternate	  or	  counter	  narrative	  strategies.	  The	  effective	  use	  of	  strategic	  communication	  (SC)	  has	  been	  referenced	  and	  recommended	  frequently	  regarding	  both	  elements.	  However,	  exactly	  what	  SC	  is	  and	  how	  it	  may	  be	  best	  utilized	  remains	  somewhat	  nebulous	  among	  both	  researchers	  and	  government.	  The	  fourth	  and	  final	  section	  of	  the	  essay	  attempts	  to	  clarify	  the	  concept	  of	  strategic	  communication	  and	  identify	  how	  it	  can	  be	  used	  more	  effectively	  to	  counter	  threats	  from	  violent	  extremism.	  The	  section	  is	  divided	  into	  three	  parts.	  The	  first	  part	  defines	  strategic	  communication	  as	  it	  relates	  to	  counter	  radicalization.	  It	  also	  describes	  the	  narrative	  context	  and	  contemporary	  information	  environment	  in	  which	  SCs	  transpire.	  The	  second	  part	  of	  the	  final	  section	  examines	  the	  U.S.	  government’s	  efforts	  to	  implement	  an	  integrative	  strategic	  communications	  framework	  and	  the	  demand	  for	  an	  even	  more	  holistic	  approach.	  The	  third	  and	  final	  part	  details	  how	  strategic	  communications	  may	  be	  used	  most	  effectively	  to	  directly	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challenge	  radical	  narratives	  within	  targeted	  populations	  and	  communities.	  The	  section	  concludes	  by	  exploring	  the	  uses	  of	  commercial	  marketing	  strategies	  in	  counter	  narrative	  operations.	  
	  Part	  I	  –Strategic	  Communications	  and	  Media	  Ecology	  
What	  are	  Strategic	  Communications	  and	  what	  is	  their	  use	  to	  Counter	  
Radicalization	  Strategy?	  	   	  	   Strategic	  communications	  are	  traditionally	  conceived	  in	  a	  military	  context	  as	  messages	  communicated	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  signaling	  and	  explaining	  intent	  to	  allies	  and	  adversaries.70	  Within	  the	  larger	  scope	  of	  foreign	  policy,	  applications	  for	  SC	  include	  messages	  conveyed	  through	  public	  diplomacy,	  development	  aid,	  democracy	  promotion,	  and	  other	  policies	  that	  communicate	  and	  support	  a	  strategic	  narrative.	  Research	  and	  analysis	  regarding	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  of	  precise	  messaging	  in	  all	  aspects	  of	  preventative	  strategy,	  including	  inter-­‐agency	  coordination	  and	  narrowing	  the	  gap	  between	  political	  rhetoric	  and	  policies.	  When	  incorporated	  into	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts,	  strategic	  communications	  may	  be	  conceived	  as	  a	  means	  to	  deliver	  effective	  policy	  and	  elicit	  desired	  responses	  from	  target	  audiences.	  	  	  	   A	  2011	  Chatham	  House	  report	  entitled	  “Strategic	  Communications	  and	  National	  Strategy”	  expounds	  on	  the	  now	  common	  acknowledgement	  among	  analysts	  that	  messages	  are	  sent	  and	  received	  through	  both	  words	  and	  actions.	  71	  When	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words	  communicate	  a	  message,	  they	  create	  an	  expectation	  for	  actions	  consistent	  with	  the	  original	  message.	  When	  actions	  communicate	  a	  message	  that	  contradicts	  or	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  words,	  words	  are	  delegitimized.	  Actions	  may	  be	  then	  interpreted	  more	  easily	  in	  the	  context	  of	  alternate	  narratives,	  in	  this	  case	  those	  provided	  by	  radical	  mavens.	  The	  report	  argues	  that	  an	  effective	  communication	  strategy	  demands	  policy	  cohesion	  and	  consistency	  between	  rhetoric	  and	  action.	  If	  applied	  holistically	  SC	  can	  serve	  not	  only	  as	  a	  means	  to	  communicate	  strategy,	  but	  also	  as	  a	  means	  to	  “deliver”	  policy.	  The	  authors	  feel	  SC	  can	  even	  achieve	  “the	  required	  ends	  of	  national	  strategy”	  by	  “going	  beyond	  media	  messaging	  to	  help	  develop	  a	  targeted	  campaign	  of	  social	  change	  by	  close	  knowledge	  of	  the	  audience.”72	  	  
Narrative	  Credibility	  and	  the	  Contemporary	  Information	  Environment	  	   Since	  9/11,	  building	  credibility	  among	  Muslim	  populations	  has	  been	  difficult	  for	  Western	  governments,	  who	  have	  tended	  to	  both	  sabotage	  their	  own	  messages	  and	  construct	  ineffective	  narratives	  from	  facts	  and	  figures	  instead	  of	  storylines	  and	  emotion.73	  	  Radical	  narratives	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  are	  effective	  at	  generating	  and	  manipulating	  an	  emotional	  response	  in	  their	  audience.	  Dipak	  Gupta	  frequently	  references	  authors	  Chip	  and	  Dan	  Heath	  to	  explain	  the	  “stickiness”	  of	  radical	  narratives.	  In	  their	  2007	  best	  seller	  ‘Made	  to	  Stick:	  Why	  Some	  Ideas	  Survive	  and	  Others	  Die,’	  the	  brothers	  posit	  that	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  a	  message	  successfully	  ‘sticks’	  with	  its	  target	  audience	  often	  depends	  on	  several	  basic	  characteristics.	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   A	  successful	  message	  must	  be	  simple,	  concrete,	  credible,	  have	  aspects	  that	  are	  
unexpected,	  and	  it	  must	  appeal	  to	  our	  emotions.	  Finally,	  it	  should	  contain	  a	  compelling	  storyline.’74	  Radical	  mavens	  have	  fashioned	  ideologies	  that	  adhere	  to	  these	  principles,	  and	  the	  radical	  narrative	  has	  proved	  to	  be	  an	  effective	  one.	  To	  an	  extent	  it	  can	  be	  argued	  that	  Western	  governments	  are	  in	  fact	  losing	  a	  marketing	  war	  to	  radical	  political	  entrepreneurs.	  “The	  West	  is	  engaged	  in	  a	  war	  against	  Islam.	  We	  must	  fight	  to	  protect	  it.	  Our	  actions	  are	  justified,	  and	  it	  is	  your	  duty	  to	  support	  us”	  –	  the	  message	  is	  simple,	  direct,	  and	  divisive.	  The	  narrative	  is	  effectively	  evidenced	  by	  continued	  Western	  presence	  and	  military	  operations	  on	  ‘Muslim	  lands’,	  and	  includes	  by	  implicit	  association	  evidence	  of	  war	  on	  every	  value	  system	  and	  socio-­‐political	  structure	  contained	  within	  local	  cultural	  systems.	  The	  element	  of	  unexpectedness	  is	  contained	  in	  the	  simplicity	  with	  which	  the	  narrative	  contextualizes	  complicated	  events,	  allowing	  the	  indoctrinated	  to	  a	  feel	  a	  clear	  understanding	  of	  a	  complex	  world.75	  	  	   Another	  reason	  it	  is	  difficult	  for	  Western	  governments	  to	  establish	  credibility	  for	  their	  narratives	  is	  the	  information	  environment	  in	  which	  this	  marketing	  war	  of	  narratives	  is	  conducted.	  The	  global	  span	  of	  the	  Internet	  and	  instantaneous	  manner	  in	  which	  it	  transmits	  information	  allows	  problems	  to	  become	  simultaneously	  local	  and	  global	  in	  nature.	  The	  ability	  of	  a	  government	  to	  shape	  the	  narrative	  through	  which	  it	  is	  perceived	  has	  been	  weakened	  by	  the	  replacement	  of	  uni-­‐directional,	  top-­‐	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  RESEARCH	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  WHITE	  PAPERS	  IN	  SUPPORT	  OF	  COUNTERTERRORISM	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  COUNTER-­‐WMD	  (p	  189)	  Retrieved	  online	  on	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down	  information	  flows	  with	  multi-­‐directional	  “all	  to	  all”	  media	  platforms	  (the	  blogosphere,	  facebook,	  Twitter,	  Tumblr,	  Instagram,	  etc).76	  Within	  these	  platforms,	  content	  is	  often	  created	  and	  contextualized	  by	  site	  users.77	  Reaction	  and	  feedback	  to	  any	  policy	  in	  any	  location	  can	  reach	  a	  global	  audience	  instantaneously.	  New	  media	  can	  be	  used	  to	  contextualize	  the	  actions	  of	  Western	  governments	  in	  radical	  narratives	  before	  traditional	  top-­‐down	  public	  relations	  have	  a	  chance	  to	  counter	  the	  interpretation.	  However,	  the	  same	  properties	  that	  enable	  effective	  propagation	  of	  radical	  ideology	  via	  new	  media	  can	  theoretically	  be	  used	  to	  counter	  its	  spread.78	  An	  effective	  communications	  strategy	  will	  generate	  consistent	  policies	  that	  fit	  within	  the	  strategic	  narrative,	  and	  also	  engage	  in	  sophisticated	  use	  of	  new	  media	  to	  maintain	  message	  control,	  combat	  message	  fratricide,	  and	  challenge	  radical	  narratives.	  Counter	  narrative	  operations	  and	  tactics	  using	  new	  media	  are	  discussed	  in	  the	  third	  part	  of	  this	  section.	  	  	   	  Part	  II	  -­‐	  National	  Framework	  for	  U.S.	  Strategic	  Communications	  
Current	  Framework	  	  	   In	  2009	  the	  Obama	  administration	  conducted	  a	  report	  focusing	  on	  “comprehensive	  interagency	  strategy	  for	  public	  diplomacy	  and	  strategic	  communication.”	  Its	  executive	  summary	  begins	  by	  stating,	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  Cornish,	  P.,	  Lindley	  Franch,	  J.,	  	  Yorke,	  C.	  (2011)	  p.	  6	  	  77	  Stevens,	  Tim	  (2010)	  pp.	  112-­‐122	  	  78Stevens,	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“Across	  all	  our	  efforts,	  effective	  strategic	  communications	  are	  essential	  to	  sustaining	  global	  legitimacy	  and	  supporting	  our	  policy	  aims.	  Aligning	  our	  actions	  with	  our	  words	  is	  a	  shared	  responsibility	  that	  must	  be	  fostered	  by	  a	  culture	  of	  communication	  throughout	  the	  government.	  We	  must	  also	  be	  more	  effective	  in	  our	  deliberate	  communication	  and	  engagement,	  and	  do	  a	  better	  job	  understanding	  the	  attitudes,	  opinions,	  grievances,	  and	  concerns	  of	  peoples	  –	  not	  just	  elites	  –	  around	  the	  world.	  Doing	  so	  is	  critical	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  convey	  credible,	  consistent	  messages,	  develop	  effective	  plans	  and	  to	  better	  understand	  how	  our	  actions	  will	  be	  perceived.”79	  	  	   The	  report	  highlights	  efforts	  by	  the	  U.S.	  government	  to	  synchronize	  its	  messaging	  and	  refine	  its	  communications	  with	  target	  audiences.	  It	  describes	  mechanisms	  for	  national-­‐level	  coordination	  (Strategic	  Communications	  Interagency	  Policy	  Committee	  [SCIPC])	  and	  operational	  level	  coordination	  between	  the	  state	  department	  and	  military.	  It	  identifies	  Joint	  Interagency	  Cooperation	  Groups	  (JICG)	  as	  the	  nexus	  of	  operational	  coordination	  between	  civilian	  and	  military	  commanders	  in	  conflict	  zones.	  Although	  they	  have	  no	  operational	  control,	  JICGs	  are	  tasked	  with	  informing	  military	  commanders	  of	  civilian	  operations	  in	  an	  attempt	  to	  achieve	  greater	  message	  control.	  The	  report	  states	  that	  in	  2009	  greater	  balance	  needed	  to	  be	  achieved	  between	  civilian	  and	  military	  operations,	  implying	  military	  actions	  predominated	  diplomatic	  and	  civilian	  initiatives.	  The	  report	  also	  described	  a	  policy	  focus	  on	  deliberate	  communication	  and	  direct	  engagement	  with	  publics,	  or	  “understanding,	  engaging,	  informing,	  influencing,	  and	  communicating	  with	  people	  through	  public	  affairs,	  public	  diplomacy,	  information	  operations	  and	  other	  efforts.”	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In	  this	  area	  of	  focus	  it	  identified	  a	  need	  for	  better	  organization	  of,	  and	  field	  access	  to,	  information,	  intelligence,	  research,	  and	  analysis	  of	  local	  audiences.80	   	  	   The	  report	  explained	  the	  framework	  of	  strategic	  communications	  for	  all	  aspects	  of	  foreign	  policy	  and	  defined	  three	  priorities	  for	  all	  areas	  of	  their	  application:	  1)	  audience	  recognition	  of	  mutual	  interest	  with	  the	  U.S.,	  2)	  audience	  belief	  that	  the	  U.S.	  plays	  a	  constructive	  role	  in	  global	  affairs,	  and	  3)	  audience	  perception	  of	  the	  U.S.	  as	  a	  respectful	  partner	  in	  efforts	  to	  meet	  complex	  global	  challenges.	  81The	  research	  reviewed	  in	  Section	  III	  of	  this	  essay	  found	  that	  improving	  the	  image	  of	  the	  U.S.	  should	  not	  be	  a	  top-­‐priority	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts.	  Instead,	  it	  found	  they	  should	  focus	  more	  directly	  on	  lessening	  the	  appeal	  of	  radical	  voices	  through	  support	  for	  respected	  and	  moderate	  voices	  within	  Muslim	  communities,	  even	  if	  they	  did	  not	  have	  a	  favorable	  opinion	  of	  the	  U.S.	  and	  its	  policies.	  These	  kinds	  of	  differences	  in	  policy	  priorities	  highlight	  the	  need	  for	  coordination	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  policies	  and	  inter-­‐agency	  communication.	  	  	   Also	  in	  2009,	  the	  Presidential	  Taskforce	  on	  Confronting	  the	  Ideology	  of	  Radical	  Extremism	  recommended	  a	  multi-­‐agency	  coordinating	  mechanism	  be	  created.	  The	  task	  force	  acknowledged	  the	  undesirability	  of	  reorganizing	  existing	  counter	  terrorism	  and	  strategic	  communication	  frameworks,	  but	  emphasized	  the	  importance	  of	  a	  mechanism	  devoted	  specifically	  to	  counter	  radicalization	  efforts,	  run	  from	  one	  office	  and	  overseen	  by	  a	  deputy-­‐level	  cabinet	  position.	  The	  office	  was	  proposed	  to	  function	  as	  a	  clearinghouse	  to	  disseminate	  information	  and	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synchronize	  policies.82	  	  In	  September	  of	  2011,	  the	  Center	  For	  Strategic	  Counterterrorism	  Communications	  (CSCC)	  was	  created	  by	  executive	  order	  to	  coordinate	  an	  integrative	  counter	  terrorism	  strategy.	  However,	  the	  CSCC	  (which	  will	  be	  discussed	  below)	  focuses	  on	  the	  coordination	  of	  counter	  narrative	  efforts,	  not	  as	  means	  to	  create	  greater	  policy	  cohesion	  and	  credibility	  for	  alternate	  narratives.	  The	  CSCC	  falls	  short	  of	  the	  task	  force’s	  recommendations,	  but	  even	  the	  mechanism	  described	  and	  recommended	  in	  its	  report	  was	  a	  top-­‐down,	  uni-­‐directional	  model	  ill-­‐designed	  for	  the	  contemporary	  global	  information	  environment.	  	  	  
A	  Theoretical	  Model	  for	  an	  Improved	  Strategic	  Communications	  Framework	  	  	   Cornish	  and	  his	  co-­‐authors	  argue	  that	  effective	  communication,	  by	  nature,	  is	  a	  two-­‐way	  process.	  It	  requires	  messages	  to	  be	  transmitted	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  generates	  appropriate	  feedback	  and	  response.	  The	  sheer	  volume	  of	  messages	  communicated	  to	  the	  U.S.	  government	  requiring	  feedback	  is	  overwhelming.	  For	  a	  central	  office	  to	  discern	  every	  message,	  develop	  a	  coordinated	  response,	  and	  respond	  appropriately	  to	  every	  signal	  related	  to	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  is	  not	  only	  inefficient,	  it	  would	  overload	  the	  clearinghouse	  and	  diminish	  the	  effectiveness	  of	  every	  other	  agency.	  In	  addition,	  the	  instantaneous	  nature	  of	  new	  media	  and	  24-­‐hour	  cable	  news	  coverage	  create	  added	  temporal	  pressure	  on	  governments’	  communications	  systems	  to	  respond	  to	  events	  quickly.83	  The	  demand	  for	  all	  levels	  of	  policy	  implementers	  to	  respond	  to	  all	  levels	  of	  policy	  dilemmas	  in	  a	  cohesive	  and	  timely	  fashion	  gives	  rise	  to	  the	  most	  intriguing	  aspect	  of	  the	  Chatham	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House	  report:	  its	  conceptualization	  of	  a	  ‘holistic’	  strategic	  communications	  framework.	  	  	   The	  model	  relies	  on	  pattern,	  consistency,	  and	  greater	  understanding	  of	  strategic	  cohesiveness	  at	  all	  levels	  of	  policy	  implementation.	  A	  central	  clearinghouse	  should	  strive	  to	  instill	  through	  inter-­‐agency	  communications	  a	  dynamic	  understanding	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  among	  every	  actor	  and	  aspect	  within	  the	  framework,	  from	  diplomats	  to	  policy	  developers,	  platoon	  leaders,	  NGO	  managers,	  and	  members	  of	  foreign	  governments.	  In	  effect,	  the	  type	  of	  communications	  framework	  they	  are	  advocating	  would	  communicate	  to	  its	  operators	  more	  than	  what	  to	  think	  before	  they	  send	  a	  message,	  it	  would	  teach	  them	  
how	  to	  think,	  and	  thus	  minimize	  informational	  fratricide	  and	  maximize	  cohesion	  among	  policies	  developed	  and	  implemented	  by	  field	  operatives.84	  	  
 A	  photograph	  on	  the	  cover	  of	  the	  report	  represents	  the	  concept	  of	  communication	  from	  clearinghouse	  to	  operators.	  The	  photograph	  is	  of	  a	  microphone,	  lying	  flat	  and	  pointing	  away	  from	  the	  reader.	  In	  the	  foreground	  is	  an	  audio	  cable,	  also	  lying	  flat	  and	  clearly	  unplugged	  from	  the	  back	  of	  the	  microphone.	  One	  idea	  the	  picture	  implies	  is	  that	  to	  communicate	  effectively,	  there	  must	  be	  a	  clear	  message	  broadcast	  at	  a	  volume	  and	  in	  a	  manner	  that	  the	  audience	  can	  receive	  and	  understand.	  The	  fact	  that	  the	  microphone	  is	  unplugged	  suggests	  that	  a	  message	  is	  not	  reaching	  its	  intended	  target.	  In	  the	  context	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  one	  might	  assume	  that	  the	  intended	  audience	  is	  those	  at-­‐risk	  to	  radicalization.	  However,	  the	  metaphor	  may	  be	  more	  appropriately	  applied	  to	  government.	  Imagine	  every	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instance	  in	  which	  an	  individual,	  agency,	  or	  organization	  representing	  ‘the	  West’	  messages	  a	  Muslim	  audience.	  Now	  imagine	  all	  those	  individuals	  together	  in	  an	  auditorium	  –	  they	  are	  the	  audience	  the	  cover	  photograph	  is	  referencing.	  Within	  this	  model,	  the	  clearinghouse	  must	  communicate	  a	  greater	  understanding	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  to	  the	  designers	  and	  implementers	  of	  policy	  in	  order	  to	  avoid	  informational	  fratricide	  and	  policy	  failure.	  Strategic	  communications	  must	  be	  a	  “central	  government	  concern	  and	  a	  whole	  government	  unifier.”	  Coordinating	  a	  deeper	  and	  more	  full	  understanding	  of	  SC	  and	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  among	  its	  transmitters	  may	  allow	  for	  quicker	  and	  more	  appropriate	  responses	  to	  a	  target	  audience.	  The	  report	  argues	  that	  if	  holistic	  understanding	  is	  propagated	  within	  the	  system,	  over	  time	  the	  messages	  it	  sends	  will	  trend	  towards	  consistency,	  cohesiveness,	  and	  ultimately,	  narrative	  credibility.85	  	  Part	  III	  –	  Countering	  Radical	  Narratives	  	   There	  is	  more	  research	  regarding	  the	  construction	  of	  credible	  alternate	  narratives	  than	  counter	  narrative	  strategy.	  Within	  the	  growing	  literature,	  some	  scholars	  and	  analysts	  feel	  defeating	  the	  radical	  Jihadist	  meta-­‐narrative	  can	  only	  be	  accomplished	  from	  within	  Islam	  by	  moderate	  leadership.	  86	  Other	  researchers	  recommend	  government-­‐run	  counter	  narrative	  operations	  remain	  transparent,	  discourse-­‐oriented	  interactions	  on	  websites	  and	  in	  online	  chat	  rooms.87At	  this	  point	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  Cornish,	  P.,	  Lindley	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  J.,	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  Report	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  Thompson,	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  R.	  (2011)	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in	  time,	  there	  is	  consensus	  that	  words	  cannot	  make	  the	  U.S.	  government	  attractive	  to	  the	  vast	  majority	  of	  Muslims	  in	  the	  Middle	  East.88	  	  Evelyn	  Early	  argues	  convincingly	  that	  anti-­‐U.S.	  government	  sentiment	  in	  the	  Arab	  world	  is	  a	  direct	  result	  of	  U.S.	  actions,	  and	  its	  abilities	  to	  counter	  the	  Jihadist	  narrative	  will	  not	  change	  public	  opinion	  towards	  American	  foreign	  policy.89	  In	  addition,	  clumsy	  messaging	  can	  easily	  be	  detected	  and	  interpreted	  as	  manipulative.	  It	  may	  be	  shunned	  or	  become	  a	  target	  for	  counter	  counter	  narratives,	  or	  simply	  upset	  moderates,	  further	  weakening	  the	  U.S.’s	  ability	  to	  influence	  its	  target	  audience.	  9091	  	   Following	  9/11	  and	  his	  identification	  of	  the	  enemy	  as	  “those	  who	  hate	  our	  freedoms,”	  George	  W.	  Bush’s	  administration	  ran	  a	  series	  of	  commercials	  in	  countries	  with	  significant	  Muslim	  majorities.	  The	  ads	  depicted	  Muslim	  women	  living	  happily	  in	  America,	  but	  they	  were	  not	  well	  received	  in	  the	  markets	  in	  which	  they	  were	  broadcast.	  Some	  researchers	  questioned	  what	  values	  the	  ads	  were	  designed	  to	  change,	  noting	  that	  those	  who	  supported	  radical	  ideologies	  were	  not	  likely	  to	  be	  swayed	  by	  depictions	  of	  life	  in	  America.92	  	  The	  campaign	  failed	  to	  realize	  contempt	  for	  the	  U.S.	  in	  Islamic	  societies	  was	  a	  reaction	  to	  “who	  we	  are”	  far	  less	  than	  it	  was	  a	  response	  to	  “what	  our	  government	  does.”	  Both	  the	  message	  and	  the	  target	  audience	  of	  the	  ads	  were	  poorly	  conceived	  by	  the	  their	  creators,	  and	  the	  ads	  proved	  to	  be	  counter-­‐productive	  attempts	  to	  counter	  radical	  ideology.	  As	  more	  research	  is	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  Leuprecht,	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conducted	  on	  counter	  narrative	  strategies	  and	  governments	  develop	  greater	  competencies	  to	  communicate	  effectively	  in	  new	  media,	  new	  ideas	  for	  counter	  narrative	  initiatives	  may	  prove	  to	  be	  effective	  applications	  for	  strategic	  communications.	  	   There	  are	  two	  main	  objectives	  for	  counter	  narrative	  strategy.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  delegitimization	  of	  radical	  ideologies	  and	  leaders.	  As	  touched	  upon	  earlier	  in	  the	  essay,	  public	  diplomacy	  is	  an	  element	  of	  this	  strategy.	  Speeches	  are	  the	  most	  direct	  form	  of	  public	  diplomacy	  although	  student	  exchange	  programs	  are	  arguably	  the	  most	  effective	  –	  they	  provide	  many	  students	  with	  direct	  and	  ostensibly	  positive	  experiences	  of	  American	  government	  and	  culture.	  In	  addition	  to	  public	  diplomacy,	  direct	  engagement	  through	  websites	  and	  online	  promotional	  materials	  attempts	  to	  make	  clear	  the	  damage	  caused	  by	  Jihadists	  to	  Muslim	  communities.	  This	  tactic	  includes	  humanizing	  the	  victims	  by	  showing	  the	  relatives	  of	  Muslims	  who	  have	  been	  killed	  by	  Al	  Qaeda.93	  Ultimately,	  these	  strategies	  seek	  to	  engage	  at-­‐risk	  Muslims	  and	  emphasize	  extremists’	  bankrupt	  ideologies.	  Towards	  this	  end,	  the	  CSCC	  maintains	  a	  “Digital	  Outreach	  Team”	  that	  “openly	  engages	  in	  Arabic,	  Urdu,	  Punjabi,	  and	  Somali	  to	  counter	  terrorist	  propaganda	  and	  misinformation	  about	  the	  United	  States	  across	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  interactive	  digital	  environments	  that	  had	  previously	  been	  ceded	  to	  extremists.”	  94	  	   Domestically,	  self-­‐radicalization	  via	  the	  Internet	  is	  a	  prominent	  concern.	  Several	  “homegrown”	  attacks	  have	  been	  successfully	  launched	  during	  the	  past	  5	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years,	  but	  the	  physical	  and	  mental	  damage	  they	  have	  caused	  has	  been	  minor	  compared	  to	  that	  caused	  by	  large-­‐scale,	  well-­‐funded,	  and	  extensively	  planned	  attacks	  historically	  preferred	  by	  global	  Jihadist	  organizations.	  Despite	  the	  lesser	  amount	  of	  damage	  it	  has	  inflicted	  to	  date,	  online	  self-­‐radicalization	  is	  the	  most	  likely	  source	  of	  successful	  future	  attacks	  in	  the	  U.S.	  and	  is	  considered	  a	  growing	  threat.	  (source)	  In	  addition	  to	  providing	  a	  location	  in	  which	  to	  engage	  and	  debate	  at-­‐risk	  or	  radicalized	  Muslims,	  new	  media	  provides	  an	  opportunity	  for	  counter	  narrative	  strategists	  to	  engage	  in	  more	  creative	  means	  of	  messaging.	  Portraying	  Al	  Qaeda	  as	  a	  “strong,	  coherent”	  force	  grants	  it	  unwarranted	  legitimacy;	  more	  effective	  strategic	  communications	  will	  make	  use	  of	  “satire	  and	  humor	  to	  humiliate	  Al	  Qaeda	  leadership.”95	  At	  CSCC,	  integrative	  analysis	  of	  intelligence	  from	  various	  agencies	  and	  experts	  is	  conducted,	  which	  is	  provides	  to	  its	  “plans	  and	  operations”	  wing.	  This	  department	  draws	  off	  ongoing	  analysis	  to	  formulate	  new	  ways	  to	  engage	  in	  counter	  narrative	  strategy	  and	  operations.96	  	   Counter	  narrative	  strategies	  also	  seek	  to	  delegitimize	  extremist	  ideology	  and	  leaders	  through	  support	  for	  moderates	  and	  alternatives	  in	  Islamic	  communities	  –	  or	  as	  the	  2009	  Presidential	  Task	  Force	  expressed,	  “stimulate	  competition	  for	  the	  would-­‐be	  radicalizer.”97	  Competition	  in	  this	  sense	  includes	  moderate	  groups	  in	  addition	  to	  both	  NGOs	  and	  partners	  in	  the	  private	  sector.	  Internationally,	  the	  CSCC	  enlists	  “credible	  Muslim	  voices	  which	  condemn	  radical	  ideology	  and	  promote	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  Center	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productive	  alternatives	  such	  as	  entertainment,	  sports,	  literature,	  education,	  and	  business	  through	  social	  networking	  technology	  and	  broadcast	  media.”98	  	  	  	   The	  CSCC	  policy	  of	  enlisting	  prominent	  cultural	  figures	  who	  promote	  moderate	  views	  through	  media	  touches	  on	  perhaps	  one	  the	  most	  interesting	  of	  counter	  narrative	  strategies:	  the	  use	  of	  media,	  pop	  culture,	  and	  marketing	  strategy	  to	  generate	  greater	  social	  cohesion	  within	  communities	  and	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  “social	  buffer”	  against	  radicalization.	  Alexis	  Everling	  writes,	  	   	  “The	  media	  should	  be	  used	  to	  shape	  the	  general	  environment	  in	  which	  the	  seeds	  of	  counter-­‐radicalization	  can	  be	  sown.	  For	  example,	  radio	  programs	  in	  FATA	  (Free	  Autonomous	  Tribal	  Areas	  in	  Pakistan)	  that	  generate	  greater	  community	  cohesion	  would	  help	  create	  a	  social	  buffer	  to	  radicalization	  (and	  in	  doing	  so	  reduce	  the	  threat	  of	  effective	  violent	  Jihadist	  messaging).	  In	  other	  words,	  the	  social	  buffer—and	  not	  the	  direct	  media	  communication	  itself—should	  be	  the	  objective	  of	  counter-­‐radicalization	  efforts.”99	  	  	   Overseas,	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  U.S.	  government	  can	  pursue	  these	  policies	  overtly	  is	  limited	  by	  a	  low	  ceiling	  of	  support	  popular	  cultural	  figures	  can	  receive	  from	  the	  U.S.	  before	  he	  or	  she	  loses	  legitimacy.	  In	  this	  regard	  NGOs	  and	  private	  sector	  partners	  may	  prove	  especially	  beneficial	  as	  proxies	  through	  which	  material	  and	  ideological	  support	  may	  be	  indirectly	  funneled.	  There	  also	  are	  other	  ways	  to	  facilitate	  social	  cohesion	  and	  the	  development	  of	  civil	  society.	  	  	  	   The	  2009	  Presidential	  Task	  Force	  on	  Countering	  the	  Ideology	  of	  Violent	  Extremism	  notes	  that	  one	  of	  the	  best	  tools	  for	  public	  diplomacy	  is	  the	  network	  of	  international	  television	  and	  radio	  stations	  including	  Voice	  of	  America	  (VOA)	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	  Thompson,	  Steven	  R.	  (2011)	  p.20	  	  99	  Everling,	  Alexis	  (2011)	  p.	  85	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Radio	  Free	  Europe/Radio	  Liberty,	  managed	  by	  the	  Broadcasting	  Board	  of	  Governors	  (BBG).	  Unfortunately,	  it	  also	  noted	  that	  BBG	  had	  been	  unresponsive	  and	  ineffective	  as	  a	  means	  of	  public	  diplomacy,	  characterizing	  the	  non-­‐partisan	  organization	  as	  paralyzed	  by	  partisan	  bickering	  in	  congress.	  It	  also	  characterized	  its	  management	  as	  lacking	  a	  sense	  of	  mission	  and	  imagination	  –	  even	  2	  years	  after	  Condoleezza	  Rice	  took	  independent	  action	  in	  2006	  to	  double	  the	  BBG’s	  budget	  for	  Iran	  through	  a	  supplemental	  appropriations	  request,	  its	  broadcasts	  there	  still	  featured	  re-­‐runs	  of	  Larry	  King	  Live	  and	  CNN	  filler	  because	  it	  lacked	  original	  programming.100	  In	  2009	  the	  	  BBG	  launched	  an	  initiative	  to	  create	  more	  original	  programming	  which	  currently	  includes	  24-­‐hour	  commercial	  free	  programming	  on	  Alhurra	  TV	  and	  Radio	  Sawa,	  both	  of	  which	  are	  moderately	  successful	  media	  outlets	  providing	  a	  coverage	  of	  world	  events	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  the	  role	  and	  policies	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  world	  affairs.	  Although	  Alhurra	  TV	  is	  a	  news	  channel,	  Radio	  Sawa	  incorporates	  a	  mix	  of	  news,	  Western,	  and	  Arabic	  popular	  music	  and	  remains	  popular	  a	  station.	  Together	  they	  reach	  a	  weekly	  audience	  of	  over	  35	  million	  people.	  101	  	   American	  pop	  culture	  is	  still	  prevalent	  within	  the	  Arab	  world.	  Over	  50%	  of	  Arab	  youths	  watch	  Western	  films	  or	  programs	  daily,	  and	  some	  of	  the	  most	  popular	  serial	  dramas	  on	  Arab	  TV	  advance	  the	  narrative	  that	  Jihadists	  are	  the	  enemy	  of	  Muslims.	  102	  According	  to	  Evelyn	  Early,	  Arab	  societies	  are	  largely	  moderate	  and	  within	  them	  it	  is	  common	  for	  an	  individual	  to	  appreciate	  Western	  culture,	  but	  strongly	  dislike	  the	  U.S.	  government.	  She	  recommends	  the	  U.S.	  employ	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  100	  Rewriting	  the	  Narrative:	  An	  Integrated	  Strategy	  for	  Counterradicalization”	  (2009)	  p.	  11	  	  101	  Broadcasting	  Board	  of	  Governors	  website.	  Retrieved	  on	  07/02/2013	  from:	  http://www.bbg.gov/broadcasters/mbn/	  	  	  102	  Early,	  Evelyn	  (2011)	  pp.	  141-­‐142	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communications	  strategy	  that	  “recognizes	  its	  cultural	  advantage	  while	  recognizing	  its	  policy	  disadvantage.”103	  Her	  recommendations	  for	  U.S.	  strategic	  communications	  are	  to	  support	  partners’	  attempts	  to	  further	  moderate	  discourse,	  but	  also	  to	  exercise	  restraint.	  Her	  research	  reveals	  that	  although	  the	  U.S.	  cannot	  see	  it	  and	  cannot	  take	  part	  in	  it,	  there	  is	  a	  vibrant	  and	  active	  discourse	  within	  the	  Arabic	  world	  about	  the	  role	  of	  religion	  in	  public	  life	  –	  in	  other	  words	  America	  should	  recognize	  and	  appreciate	  the	  discourse	  happening	  below	  the	  surface	  in	  many	  Muslim	  societies.	  	   Risks	  attendant	  to	  engaging	  in	  counter	  narrative	  operations	  include	  creating	  greater	  resentment	  of	  the	  U.S.	  government,	  undercutting	  credibility	  for	  the	  alternate	  narrative	  it	  seeks	  to	  provide,	  and	  lending	  more	  credibility	  to	  radical	  narratives.	  Western	  governments	  should	  allow	  moderate	  elements	  within	  Islamic	  cultures	  to	  counter	  radical	  ideologies	  without	  clumsy,	  unnecessary,	  and	  counter	  productive	  efforts.	  Counter	  narrative	  operations	  that	  target	  a	  political	  spectrum	  are	  best	  undertaken	  through	  public	  diplomacy	  and	  traditional	  mediums	  that	  engage	  popular	  culture	  by	  providing	  news,	  opinion,	  and	  apolitical	  entertainment.	  These	  efforts	  must	  remain	  cognizant	  of	  risks	  and	  sensitive	  to	  cultural	  sensibilities,	  and	  they	  should	  refrain	  from	  communicating	  overtly	  subversive	  messages.	  	   Counter	  narrative	  operations	  that	  target	  at-­‐risk	  segments	  of	  Muslim	  societies	  may	  use	  humor,	  derision,	  and	  marketing	  savvy	  to	  counter	  radical	  narratives	  more	  aggressively.	  New	  media	  is	  less	  intrusive	  and	  requires	  messages	  that	  attract	  the	  target	  audience	  in	  order	  to	  engage	  it.	  Using	  greater	  understandings	  of	  new	  media	  platforms	  and	  competency	  for	  strategic	  communications,	  operators	  in	  the	  CSCC	  and	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private	  sector	  may	  one	  day	  develop	  messages	  that	  “stick”	  and	  thrive	  within	  at-­‐risk	  youth.	  
	  	  	  
Conclusion	  
	   Terrorism	  is	  a	  complex	  phenomenon	  created	  by	  political	  and	  social	  forces.	  Among	  those	  forces,	  radicalization	  is	  a	  key	  mechanism	  for	  consolidating	  individual	  grievances	  and	  mobilizing	  a	  threat	  against	  Western	  interests	  and	  societies. The	  nature	  of	  the	  threat	  posed	  to	  global	  security	  by	  radical	  Islamic	  extremists	  is	  unique	  to	  their	  particular	  form	  of	  “new”	  terrorism	  and	  its	  drivers	  for	  increasingly	  spectacular	  and	  horrific	  attacks.	  Traditional,	  kinetic	  counter	  terrorism	  operations	  have	  proven	  counter-­‐productive	  to	  lessening	  the	  influence	  of	  radical	  voices.	  The	  relationship	  of	  radicalization	  to	  violent	  extremism	  has	  created	  demand	  for	  a	  nuanced,	  cognitive	  approach	  to	  lessen	  the	  threat	  through	  non-­‐kinetic	  preventative	  strategies.	  	   	  	  Although	  there	  are	  many	  different	  drivers	  that	  push	  and	  pull	  individuals	  towards	  radicalization	  and	  violent	  extremism,	  all	  militant	  Jihadists	  share	  belief	  in	  the	  same	  meta-­‐narrative.	  The	  narrative	  supports	  ideologies	  that	  contextualize	  grievances	  and	  bridge	  the	  gap	  between	  personal	  grievance	  and	  mobilization	  for	  terrorist	  actions.	  Counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  combat	  terrorism	  by	  mitigating	  grievances,	  radical	  ideologies,	  and	  to	  a	  lesser	  extent	  mobilization	  within	  individuals,	  groups,	  and	  societies.	  It	  can	  be	  divided	  into	  two	  categories	  –	  alternate	  narrative	  strategy	  and	  counter	  narrative	  strategy.	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   Achieving	  greater	  consistency	  between	  word	  and	  deed	  is	  the	  first	  step	  to	  mitigating	  grievances	  and	  establishing	  a	  credible	  alternate	  narrative.	  Engaging	  in	  and	  supporting	  development	  and	  reform	  efforts	  benefitting	  all	  levels	  of	  society	  is	  fundamental	  to	  building	  credibility	  and	  improving	  the	  image	  of	  the	  U.S.	  in	  Muslim	  societies.	  	  However,	  although	  long-­‐term	  foreign	  policy	  priorities	  include	  improving	  its	  image,	  short	  and	  mid-­‐term	  counter	  radicalization	  priorities	  dictate	  the	  U.S.	  should	  support	  moderate	  narratives	  even	  if	  a	  narrative	  fails	  to	  improve	  its	  image	  within	  the	  target	  audience.	  In	  order	  to	  best	  nurture	  alternate	  narratives	  within	  Muslim	  communities,	  the	  U.S.	  should	  pursue	  development	  and	  reform	  efforts	  in	  a	  manner	  dictated	  by	  the	  community’s	  wants	  and	  needs,	  not	  it’s	  own	  foreign	  policy	  goals.	  Successfully	  managing	  this	  process	  to	  meet	  community	  wants	  and	  needs	  and	  policy	  goals	  requires	  specific	  understanding	  of	  both	  local	  audiences	  and	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  strategic	  communications.	  	   Improved	  strategic	  communications	  are	  necessary	  for	  better	  implementation	  of	  all	  aspects	  of	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy.	  The	  U.S.	  national	  strategic	  communications	  framework	  could	  benefit	  by	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  central	  clearinghouse	  focused	  on	  achieving	  message	  consistency	  and	  coordinating	  a	  deeper	  and	  more	  holistic	  understanding	  of	  communications	  and	  counter	  radicalization	  strategies	  to	  policy	  designers	  and	  implementers	  at	  all	  levels.	  	   Efforts	  to	  counter	  radical	  narratives	  through	  public	  diplomacy,	  traditional	  media,	  and	  the	  virtual	  world	  of	  “new”	  media	  will	  benefit	  by	  implementing	  improved	  communications.	  Better	  understanding	  and	  more	  effective	  use	  of	  new	  media	  may	  include	  strategic	  use	  of	  media	  platforms,	  social	  networks,	  video	  imaging,	  and	  
	   59	  
contemporary	  marketing	  strategies	  to	  create	  “sticky”	  content	  that	  thrives	  in	  the	  new	  information	  environment.	  	  	   The	  ability	  of	  strategic	  communications	  to	  mitigate	  grievance,	  ideology,	  and	  mobilization	  of	  terrorist	  networks	  by	  facilitating	  greater	  social	  cohesion	  and	  healthy	  civil	  societies	  needs	  to	  be	  explored	  further,	  and	  if	  proven	  effective,	  pursued	  vigorously.	  	   The	  most	  effective	  communications	  may	  be	  those	  outside	  the	  control	  of	  U.S.	  strategic	  operations.	  Both	  types	  of	  narrative	  strategy	  find	  great	  utility	  in	  partnerships	  with	  moderates	  in	  Islamic	  communities.	  Partnering	  with	  moderates	  allows	  both	  alternate	  and	  counter	  narrative	  strategic	  goals	  to	  be	  advanced	  through	  proxies	  who	  can	  engage	  the	  audience	  in	  theological	  discourse.	  The	  Jihadist	  narrative	  appears	  to	  have	  lost	  a	  degree	  of	  influence	  in	  Muslim	  societies.	  Although	  radicalization	  has	  spread,	  the	  number	  of	  sympathizers	  may	  to	  be	  declining	  following	  the	  peak	  of	  sectarian	  violence	  during	  the	  Iraq	  war.	  Radical	  extremism	  in	  Islam	  may	  well	  run	  its	  course	  and	  fade	  as	  a	  threat	  to	  the	  U.S.	  and	  Europe.	  Islamist	  governments	  were	  elected	  in	  many	  of	  the	  countries	  that	  underwent	  revolution	  during	  the	  Arab	  spring,	  and	  as	  difficulties	  and	  grievances	  persist	  or	  grow	  worse	  under	  the	  their	  stewardship,	  it	  will	  become	  increasingly	  difficult	  to	  place	  universal	  blame	  on	  the	  West,	  and	  the	  U.S.	  in	  particular.	  It	  is	  also	  true,	  as	  Brigadeer	  Gen.	  Jack	  Shanahan	  cautioned	  in	  Air	  Force	  Research	  Laboratory	  white	  paper	  on	  countering	  extremism,	  that	  counter-­‐radicalization	  strategies	  may	  have	  unintended	  consequences	  and	  must	  be	  approached	  as	  a	  doctor	  approaches	  a	  patient	  –	  ‘First,	  do	  no	  harm.’	  The	  best	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course	  of	  action	  may	  be	  “to	  do	  nothing	  at	  all.”104	  However,	  because	  the	  threat	  is	  active	  and	  significant,	  Western	  security	  agencies	  will	  continue	  to	  engage	  in	  counter	  strategies	  against	  violent	  extremism.	  Among	  possible	  strategies,	  a	  well-­‐conceived	  and	  effectively	  communicated	  preventative	  counter	  radicalization	  strategy	  is	  the	  best	  option.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	  Shanahan,	  Brig.	  Gen.	  John	  (2011)	  pp.1-­‐2	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Table.	  I	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Types	  Of	  Radicalized	  Violent	  Extremists	  As	  Classified	  By	  Author	  	  
Col.	  Matt	  Venhause105	  	  (2010	  )	   Tom	  Bjorgo1	  	  (undated)	   Peter	  Nesser1	  (	  2006	  )	  –	  Applies	  specifically	  to	  “homegrown”	  radicals	  within	  Western	  Democracies.	  	  1. Frustrated	  revenge	  seekers	  2. Status	  seekers	  in	  search	  of	  recognition	  3. Identity	  seekers	  4. Thrill	  Seekers	  	  
	  1. Ideological	  activists	  2. Drifters	  and	  fellow	  travelers	  3. Socially	  frustrated	  youth	  
	  1. Immigrants,	  especially	  2nd	  generataion	  2. Political	  refugees	  3. Converts	  4. Those	  with	  criminal	  and	  drug-­‐filled	  backgrounds	  	  	  
Tom	  Reigers106	  	  (2011)	  	  	  	   	  Tom	  Reigers–	  Continued	  (2011)	   	  Dipak	  Gupta107	  (2010)	  –	  Applies	  to	  ideological	  entrpreneurs,	  norm	  creators,	  and	  organizational	  leaders	  	  	  Type	  1	  radical:	  	  	  a)	  Elitist/intolerant	  	  b)	  Lack	  confidence	  in	  gov’t	  c)	  Mainstream	  d)	  Experienced	  Hardship	  	  	  
	  	  Type	  2	  radical:	  	  a)	  Self-­‐perception	  as	  victim	  b)	  Lower	  income	  c)	  Leader	  seeking	  d)	  Ideology	  seeking	  	  
	  1.	  Connectors	  –	  wealthy	  	  	  	  	  	  	  organizers	  utilizing	  established	  	  	  	  	  social,	  political,	  and	  economic	  	  	  	  	  networks	  2.	  Mavens	  –	  theologians,	  providers	  	  	  	  	  of	  ideology,	  constructors	  of	  	  	  	  	  narrative	  and	  message	  3.	  Salesman	  –	  charismatic	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  persuasive	  individuals	  who	  	  	  	  	  	  attract	  new	  members	  	  	  	  
Fig.	  1	  is	  a	  chart	  compiled	  from	  several	  individual	  sources	  in	  addition	  to	  an	  extensive	  
literature	  review	  conducted	  by	  Dr.	  Alex	  Schmidt	  from	  the	  International	  Center	  for	  Counter	  
Terrorism.	  It	  compares	  several	  of	  the	  many	  attempts	  to	  type	  terrorists	  and	  classify	  the	  triggers	  
and	  drivers	  that	  push	  and	  pull	  them	  towards	  radical	  ideologies	  and	  violent	  extremism.	  An	  
individual	  may	  be	  driven	  by	  multiple	  motivating	  factors	  and	  may	  fall	  into	  more	  than	  one	  
category.	  The	  purpose	  of	  the	  chart	  is	  to	  emphasize	  the	  complexity	  of	  terrorists’	  possible	  
motivations	  and	  highlight	  the	  cross-­‐section	  of	  actors	  at	  risk	  to	  radicalization.	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  Discussion	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  Literature	  
Review.	  ICCT	  Reasearch	  Paper	  (pp	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  International	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  Counter	  Terrorism.	  Retrieved	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  2013	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